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In September 2008, the financial crisis turned into the worst global economic crisis in 80 years as the 
world experienced the largest drop in international trade ever and sharp contractions in foreign direct 
investment flows and income from remittances and tourism. In 2009, the economies representing 80% of 
global GDP were hit by the ensuing recession, which, in scope and depth, was comparable only with the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean did not escape the repercussions of this international crisis: 
regional GDP fell by 1.7%, unemployment rose, and poverty indicators worsened slightly. The region 
nevertheless withstood the situation better than in previous crises, when lesser shocks had a far greater 
impact on the economies and far more serious social consequences. The region’s resilience this time 
around speaks well of the economic capacity it built up during the preceding international economic 
boom cycle and its good macroeconomic management practices, including fiscal responsibility, inflation 
control, the sound administration of the external accounts and the maintenance of adequate international 
reserves. The strong performance in these areas meant that, also for the first time, the region was not 
rocked by exchange or financial and balance-of-payments crises as is has been in the past. Most of the 
countries were in fact able to react by adopting countercyclical measures that softened the impact of the 
crisis on employment and social indicators.  
 
The worst of the crisis now seems to be over. The global economy’s recovery is showing signs of 
being rather fragile, however. In the world’s major economies, the recovery is still dependent on the fiscal 
stimulus packages that the Governments have implemented. The mode and timing of the withdrawal of 
these stimuli, the restructuring of the financial balances of private actors and the return to more 
sustainable fiscal deficits and public debt levels in the industrialized economies are issues that will shape 
the world economic situation in the years ahead.  
 
The crisis has not lessened (and in some ways it has heightened) the urgency with which Latin 
America and the Caribbean should tackle some of the basic issues that need to be addressed to improve 
the region’s integration in the world economy: the intensity of technological change and the importance 
of innovation, the growing weight of China and other emerging economies in the global economy and, 
last but by no means least, climate change. The characteristics of the latest crisis have highlighted the 
need to reform financial regulation and the international financial system. And this complex agenda will 
have to be tackled during a period of slower economic growth and comparatively high unemployment in 
the industrialized economies, which will necessarily be making major adjustments to their budgets. Given 
the magnitude of the political and economic challenges facing countries in the twenty-first century, some 
signs of protectionism are to be expected.  
 
The international agenda is becoming increasingly complex, not only because of the fragility of 
the macroeconomic and financial situation, but also because of the slow response of the global institutions 
to the emergence of new issues and stakeholders. The emerging economies, headed by China, India, other 
Asian economies and Brazil, will in fact gain an increasingly larger presence on the world stage in the 
second decade of the century, underscoring the importance of South-South trade. Even larger cracks will 
appear in countries’ capacity to govern the forces of globalization unless they adapt to the new rules for 
competing on international markets and the new distribution of international power and as long as they 
remain incapable of fielding effective responses to such pressing global demands such as the handling of 
climate change and the reform of the international financial system, to name but a few of the principal 
challenges facing the world today.  
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Now is the time to establish regional forums that have sufficient technical support to react 
opportunely at key moments in the international debate. A renewed, effective multilateralism is urgently 
needed to give legitimacy to international negotiations on finance, trade and climate change. Spaces for 
dialogue and regional cooperation are needed where diagnoses and proposals can be sharpened and shared 
with a view to presenting unified positions at international forums that make it possible to better defend 
the region’s interests. 
 
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean will therefore have to redouble their efforts to 
build broader regional forums and undertake cooperation initiatives that can unlock the synergies of the 
different subregions. Coordination among the various subregional cooperation and integration schemes is 
now urgently required, as are progress with their gradual convergence and the eventual transition towards 
more unified schemes.  
 
It is in light of these considerations and upon the request of the Government of Mexico that the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) submits this document for the 
consideration of the region’s highest authorities. Opportunities for regional cooperation are examined in 
eight areas. Four of these pertain to intraregional cooperation: infrastructure, aid for trade, strengthening 
the social component of integration, and the reduction of asymmetries. The other four refer to cooperation 
on global issues: innovation and competitiveness, the joint pursuit of closer ties with Asia-Pacific, the 
reform of the international financial system, and climate change. 
 
We trust that this document will make a contribution to furthering regional cooperation and 
integration, which constitute two of the most effective instruments for tackling the economic and social 





 Alicia Bárcena 
 Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission 











Compared with 2003-2007, which was the most favourable period the world and regional economies had 
seen in 40 years, the outlook for the future is less encouraging. In the early 2010s the world economy and 
global trade will experience reduced growth rates, increased competitive tension and protectionist 
pressure, and tighter access to financing. In the wake of the crisis, the industrialized countries will face 
slower economic growth and high unemployment at a time when they will also have to restore the 
sustainability of their public accounts. The emerging economies, headed by China, together with India, 
other Asian economies and Brazil, will gain an increasingly larger presence on the world stage in the 
second decade of the century. The driving forces of economic growth and international trade will shift 
even more rapidly towards the Pacific and the emerging economies, underscoring the importance of 
South-South trade.  
 
Fragile international macroeconomic conditions and the slow response of the global institutions to 
the new challenges that are arising are eroding the relevance of the multilateral institutions, which has 
worrying implications for the developing countries, as no effective alternatives exist that can address the 
new challenges of this century. The Doha Round of trade talks will soon have been under way for a 
decade but is still far from fulfilling its commitment to development. The fifteenth session of the 
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in 
Copenhagen, concluded with more uncertainties than certainties. And the meetings of the Group of 
Twenty (G-20) allow for little optimism regarding the new financial regulations and the forthcoming 
reform of the international financial system.  
 
Consequently, greater regional cooperation and closer collaboration between and within the 
subregions is no longer merely a major political objective, but also an economic imperative if the region 
is to integrate into a global economy that is increasingly structured around regional or subregional value 
chains. Thus, measures in areas such as infrastructure, energy, connectivity and trade and transport 
facilitation will be crucial for competitiveness and growth. 
 
Given the weak demand for the region’s products among most of its major partners, intraregional 
trade has a key role to play in spurring the recovery of demand for the goods and services the region 
produces. This has not occurred yet, however, in part, on account of the emergence of trade-restricting 
measures, but mainly owing to the persistence of major deficits in infrastructure and connectivity and 
discrepancies in the rules governing the flow of goods, services, investments and persons. More open 
intraregional trade that respects the liberalization commitments already assumed would not only help to 
offset the fall in external demand, at least in part, it would also stimulate the development of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Intraregional trade has been shown to be more intensive among SMEs, 
to consist of goods with a higher value added content and to be more labour-intensive than extraregional 
trade. It is therefore imperative to ensure that regional integration does not fall victim to the repercussions 
of an international crisis that the region did not generate.  
 
It is with this purpose in mind, and after examining the main characteristics of the post-crisis 
scenario and identifying the ensuing demand for greater regional cooperation, that the following proposals 
to boost that cooperation are presented. These proposals are not dependent on free trade agreements and, 
consequently, the differing views held on trade and development in the region should not hamper the 






SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS 
 
 
The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean proposes focusing regional cooperation 
efforts on eight areas: four of them refer to intraregional issues (fostering trade within the region, 
investment in infrastructure, social cohesion and reducing asymmetries) and the other four to cooperation 
for addressing global challenges: innovation, forging closer ties as a region with Asia-Pacific, reforming 
the international financial system and climate change. Specific proposals for action are presented for each 
of these areas.  
 
Advances in the selected areas would benefit from a unified and more effective institutional 
framework within the region. A representative framework of this kind could help to reconcile any 
opposing interests that may arise between countries, while paying special attention to the interests of the 
smallest or relatively less developed countries.  
 
 
A. PROPOSALS FOR PROMOTING REGIONAL COOPERATION 
 
 
1. Fostering intraregional trade 
 
A programme for fostering intraregional trade should be set up, supported by more substantial 
financial resources and concerted trade facilitation measures. Attracting more inflows of aid for trade 
would help to achieve this. It is not necessary to establish new institutions but rather to generate coordination 
mechanisms between existing ones, drawing on their strengths and mobilizing financial resources. 
 
Financing for trade. The recent crisis demonstrated how important it is to strengthen 
international financial institutions by building up their capital and capacity for rapid response in order to 
forestall possible balance-of-payment crises, as well as regional financial institutions, by promoting their 
capitalization and by ensuring greater complementarity with development banks. In the short term, 
national and regional financial agencies must cover risks and boost liquidity for foreign-trade operations, 
while ensuring that the necessary credit is available. In the medium term, financial institutions must 
ensure that businesses are kept abreast of the characteristics of their instruments and understand the 
techniques of risk assessment and compilation of data on trade financing. 
 
An integrated approach to trade facilitation. This means not just reducing the amount of 
bureaucratic formalities involved in foreign trade or the time needed to complete them but also speeding up 
trade transactions, notably by ensuring the availability of transport infrastructure and information and 
communications technologies (ICT) at internationally competitive prices. Emphasis should be placed on 
public policies that facilitate access by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to these improvements. 
 
In terms of trade facilitation, the region must go beyond the Doha Round. The countries of 
the region should consider implementing the proposals they themselves put forward at the Doha Round at 
the national, subregional or regional level. Indeed, at the regional level, it is possible to go beyond the 
scope and depth envisaged within the World Trade Organization. To this end, steps must be taken to 
strengthen coordination between regional finance agencies and regional research and advisory bodies, 
such as ECLAC. In this way, Governments can receive assistance in updating their technical know-how 
and in building capacities in trade facilitation and other related areas. 
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At the national level, this means not just improving coordination between the Government 
agencies involved but also relying on various public-private partnership mechanisms that reinforce 
communication between stakeholders as well as dialogue on policy reforms and the commitment of 
business organizations to innovation and competitiveness.  
 
At the subregional and regional level, the following suggestions are made: (i) facilitate the 
convergence of procedures, in particular with respect to their interoperability and standardization by advancing 
in successive phases to harmonize, streamline, automate and interconnect customs and foreign-trade 
procedures in general; and (ii) move forward more rapidly to obtain legal recognition of modern business 
instruments and procedures, such as electronic billing, electronic certificates of origin and inter-agency single 
windows for foreign trade.  
 
The Latin American and Caribbean region should increase its share of aid-for-trade flows, 
which stood at 8% in 2007, compared with 42% for Asia and 37% for Africa. To improve their share, the 
countries of the region must make aid for trade a central component of their requests for international 
cooperation, establish priorities and present relevant projects to secure new flows of resources. The focus 
should be on attracting funds towards projects such as the Initiative for the Integration of Regional 
Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) and the Meso-American Project, in which several countries 
participate and which have a clear trade-facilitation component.  
 
 
2. Preserving and boosting investment in infrastructure 
 
Regional cooperation should seek to reduce the “infrastructure gap” characteristic of Latin America 
and the Caribbean. To this end, the proposals are as follows: (i) agree on a regional or subregional 
indicative target for investment in infrastructure, which could be of the order of 5% of GDP, bearing in 
mind the specificities of each subregion or country; (ii) set up regional or subregional infrastructure funds 
with inputs from public resources, financial institutions and regional development banks; (iii) strengthen 
capital markets and their regulation in such a way as to ensure that capital and pension funds play a more 
important role in infrastructure financing; (iv) reinforce support at the highest level for physical 
infrastructure initiatives in the region, monitoring and resolving rapidly any bottlenecks that may develop; 
and (v) step up convergence between land-traffic and multimodal regulation and control systems. 
 
At the national level, the following steps should be taken: (i) develop integrated infrastructure, 
transport and logistics strategies that can be sustained over time; (ii) review policies for regulation of 
infrastructure services, seeking to ensure that improvements in this area not only boost private 
participation but also are transmitted effectively to society and become channels for achieving greater 
efficiency, productivity and competitiveness; (iii) strengthen national public investment systems, 
improving the quality of projects and effective opportunities for securing external financing; (iv) support 
the development of benchmarking systems for the main categories of infrastructure works, by facilitating 
the comparability of projects and avoiding overpricing in relevant bidding processes. Once these 
proposals have been successfully implemented, it will be easier to move towards adopting an integrated 





3. Strengthening the social aspect of integration 
 
What is needed is regional competitiveness that is compatible with social equity. This implies 
addressing issues relating to social cohesion and inclusion as well as multicultural and gender policy 
issues. One of the merits of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA) has been to 
give prominence to social issues as being central to regional cooperation and integration efforts. It is 
recommended that steps be taken to: (i) improve the quality of social statistics at the national level while 
seeking to harmonize them and make them comparable at the regional level; (ii) identify regional best 
practices on corporate social responsibility; (iii) evaluate ways to reduce remittance costs for migrants 
sending funds to their countries of origin; (iv) promote the certification of labour skills across countries, 
so as to stimulate intraregional movement of less-skilled workers; (v) obtain reciprocal recognition of 
professional qualifications; (vi) support the implementation of portable social protection schemes; 
(vii) encourage investment in infrastructure and integrated production development strategies along 
border areas, including social policy measures for the protection of migrants; (viii) set up a structural fund 
for social cohesion to help finance production and labour restructuring and reproduce the best experiences 
of social protection during crises; and (ix) create a social inclusion observatory that can provide 
Governments, academics, parliaments and civil society with the information necessary to monitor social 
policy, share experiences and disseminate good practices. 
 
 
4. Improving treatment of asymmetries 
 
The issue of asymmetries is horizontal in nature. Therefore, a special effort is required to ensure that in 
each area of regional cooperation described herein an approach is taken that adjusts for asymmetries to 
the benefit of the relatively less developed economies. In this context, a special effort on behalf of Haiti is 
imperative as the region's commitment to solidarity should manifest itself fully in this case. 
 
Without undermining the comprehensive treatment that should be given to asymmetries, the 
following specific actions are proposed: (i) strengthen structural fund systems aimed at relatively less 
developed countries along the lines of the positive experience of the MERCOSUR Structural 
Convergence Fund (FOCEM) and similar initiatives in other subregional systems; (ii) encourage larger 
partners to open their markets to exports from relatively less developed countries, which would include 
reducing not only tariff but also non-tariff barriers; and (iii) encourage larger partners to consider 
carefully the impacts their macroeconomic policies and incentives for investment and exports have on the 
competitiveness of the smaller economies. 
 
 
B. BUILDING REGIONAL CAPACITY TO ADDRESS GLOBAL CHALLENGES 
 
 
1. Increasing regional cooperation in innovation and competitiveness 
 
The knowledge economy presents new challenges to the region’s countries. Science, technology and 
innovation play increasingly important roles not only for their integration into the global economy but 
ultimately in their prospects for economic and social development. However, with few exceptions, the 
countries of the region allocate limited amounts of resources to these issues. Therefore, it is essential that 
national efforts be combined, giving preference to associative approaches, an example of which would be 
to engage technology centres in integrated, multinational research and business activities, creating 
synergies and generating a critical mass of human and financial resources. At the national level, this 
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approach also requires the following: (i) greater coordination among the various public agencies involved 
in competitiveness issues; and (ii) the creation of public-private alliances that allow information to be 
shared and objectives to be defined by common agreement. 
 
In this context, the following actions are proposed: (i) establish a regional innovation forum 
that will facilitate cooperation and joint actions by countries in addressing the challenges of innovation 
and technological development; (ii) create a regional innovation cooperation fund that will finance 
programmes or actions as determined by the regional forum or by other cooperation initiatives; 
(iii) promote the creation and development of regional corporate foundations for innovation; (iv) prepare 
an annual report on regional innovation initiatives, to serve as a guide for national and regional efforts on 
this issue and as a compendium of experiences to be shared; (v) continue with comparative analyses of 
national strategies relating to the information society, though country reviews; (vi) support the White 
Book of e-Government Interoperability in Latin America and the Caribbean as a common framework for 
regional action and discussion on ICT; and (vii) develop the region’s capacity to use ICT effectively in 
sectors such as e-government, ICT-related industries, high-speed networks, health and education. 
 
 
2. Deepening regional integration through closer ties with Asia-Pacific 
 
Asia-Pacific, the most dynamic region in the world economy, offers multiple opportunities to Latin 
America and the Caribbean in areas such as mining, energy, agriculture, infrastructure and science 
and technology. Given the vast size of Asia’s markets, it will only be possible to take full advantage of 
these opportunities through a coordinated partnership-building effort among the countries of the region. 
Nevertheless, until now no coordinated strategy has been developed among countries or groups of 
countries to forge strategic investment and trade links with Asia-Pacific; rather, there have mainly been 
sporadic, individual attempts.  
 
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean need to take a more coordinated 
approach to building closer ties with Asia-Pacific. The countries of the region should strengthen their 
trade ties and increase their productive complementarity with Asia-Pacific, striving to integrate into Asian 
production and export chains. To do so, they will need to form trade and investment partnerships that go 
beyond free trade agreements. Although these agreements may be important, they are not enough to 
generate the scale and critical mass needed to encourage trade and technology partnerships between the 
two regions, or to reduce the marked asymmetry between the large volumes of trade and small reciprocal 
levels of investment. 
 
Joint efforts to strengthen ties with Asia-Pacific through multinational business and 
ministerial missions would help to promote project portfolios in infrastructure, energy, banking, 
tourism and logistics, to the benefit of both regions. Reaching consensuses on such a portfolio, as well 
as on other trade and investment initiatives, might be a first step for holding technical meetings with 
Asian counterparts, including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Asian Development Bank 
and the China Development Bank. Subsequently, high-level political meetings could be held to raise the 
level of dialogue with Asia-Pacific on the basis of a shared regional agenda. A collective response to the 
Policy Paper on the relations of the People’s Republic of China with Latin America and the Caribbean, 





3. Reforming the international financial system 
 
The governance of the institutions that make up the international financial architecture must 
undergo a thorough reform. Such a reform should ensure that decisions are taken and rules established in 
such a manner as to take account of the requirements of all countries, especially developing ones. The lack 
of representation of developing countries at multilateral forums makes these institutions’ analyses and 
recommendations on regulatory policies incomplete, which leads to significant mistakes, as evidenced by 
the oversight and regulatory failures that were among the leading causes of the recent crisis. The region 
should do more to make the most of the presence of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico in the Group of Twenty 
(G-20) in order to take common stances and defend them in this and other important forums. 
 
Subregional financial cooperation must play a significant role by complementing reforms to 
the global financial architecture. Stronger subregional institutions would serve as an additional line of 
defence against the effects of future financial crises and prevent them from spreading. Hence, it is 
necessary to: (i) strengthen the Latin American Reserve Fund; (ii) consolidate the regional and 
subregional capital markets; and (iii) give a larger role to subregional development banks. 
 
 
4. Jointly tackling climate change challenges 
 
For the region, the best way to reduce the risks associated with unilateral, protectionist measures 
by the industrialized countries is to reach a sound multilateral agreement on climate change. 
Consequently, there is a need to move forward with efforts to reach a binding agreement in 2010, based 
on the modest results of the fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, held in Copenhagen in December 2009. The region needs to prepare well 
for these negotiations, because, if it fails to do so, within a few years it might have to comply with global 
standards that overlook its interests and to face environmental and energy standards that limit its ability to 
become more competitive. 
 
The region must strengthen and broaden its initiatives for regional cooperation on the 
adaptation and mitigations policies that are part of national and regional development strategies. 
Some cooperation activities in this field are as follows: (i) creation of a climate-change policy observatory 
to monitor discussions and progress on the topic and corporate- and public-policy measures; 
(ii) development of specific studies and methodologies for evaluating the economic impacts of climate 
change in the various sectors and subregions; (iii) implementation of programmes to support the 
development of renewable energy and energy efficiency in consumption, production and transportation, 
and of clean industries, among others; (iv) sharing of experiences with carbon-market projects; 
(v) cooperation on adapting national finance institutions and granting facilities to fund projects for 
mitigating the impact of climate change; (vi) a proposal on mechanisms that will make it possible to 
obtain joint access to international funds for capacity-building and technology transfer, for both 
adaptation and mitigation; (vii) agreement on necessary carbon-market reforms, including the evaluation 
of mechanisms used to finance adaptation measures; (viii) coordination of policies for boosting lower-
carbon investments; and (ix) building of a regional consensus on a set of public policies for moving 








I. POST-CRISIS SCENARIOS 
 
 
A. THE MAIN EFFECTS OF THE CRISIS ON LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN 
 
 
The deep economic crisis of 2008-2009, which had its epicentre in the United States and other 
industrialized countries, spread to the real economy of Latin America and the Caribbean by a 
number of channels. The impact of this external shock was more severe than that of the Asian crisis 
or the external debt crisis (see figure I.1). Estimates for 2009 show a drop of 10% and 15% in volumes 
and prices, respectively, for goods exported by the region. There was also a decline of 15% in exports of 
services, 37% in foreign direct investment flows and 13% in remittances. Overall, the region has been 
coping without suffering drastic repercussions in terms of GDP growth or employment, thanks to the 
combination of the favourable business cycle from which it is emerging (2003-2007) and improved 
economic policy management, which means that it has been able not only to cope better with the crisis 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGE IN GOODS AND SERVICES 






















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Preliminary Overview of the Economies of 

































One of the variables most affected by the crisis was international trade. In late 2008 and the 
first half of 2009, the value of the region’s exports fell at annualized rates in excess of 30%. Latin 
America and the Caribbean experienced a smaller decline in external sales than Africa and the Middle 
East or Central and Eastern Europe, but a similar one to the United States and the euro area (see 
figure I.2). While the loss of revenue from (basically manufacturing) exports in 2009 in the industrialized 
countries and developing Asia is mainly accounted for by the decline in export volumes, in Latin America 
and the Caribbean it has been due in particular to lower prices (-15%, mostly commodities). The region’s 
imports also underwent a severe adjustment, collapsing by 24% in 2009. By contrast with exports, the 




SELECTED COUNTRIES AND REGIONS: EXPORT VOLUMES AND PRICES, 
JULY 2008-OCTOBER 2009 






















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Netherlands Bureau of 
Economic Policy Analysis, “World-trade monitor”, 2010. 
 
 
The fall in exports in 2009 was very heterogeneous across the different categories of goods 
and the different origin and destination markets. First, the drop in exports hit all sectors but to 
differing degrees: while the value of agricultural product exports fell by less (-18%) than that of regional 
exports overall, mining products and oil fell by more than the average (-42%), while manufacturing 
export revenues fell by 25%. Second, regarding exports by destination, while sales within the region and 
to the United States and European Union fell by between 31% and 33%, sales to China declined by a 
mere 2%. Lastly, there were also significant differences between the subregions of Latin America and the 
Caribbean as regards the drop in export revenue: the greatest decline was seen in the Andean countries 















































































































The downturn in regional trade is unprecedented in recent history. In 2009, the volume of 
regional exports fell by almost 10%. A comparable drop in trade, both volume and prices, has not 
occurred in 72 years (1937) in the case of exports, and in 27 years (1982) in the case of imports. This is an 
historic record only surpassed by the sharp slowdown in trade in the period immediately following the 
crisis of 1929. 
 
Large numbers of developed and developing countries have introduced trade measures to 
try to contain the impact of the global crisis on their economies. These measures include tariff hikes, 
antidumping duties, non-tariff barriers such as import licences and more stringent technical standards, 
subsidies to the banking sector, the automobile industry and agriculture, discriminatory public 
procurement practices and restrictions on immigration or on the hiring of foreign workers, among others. 
Despite these signs of protectionism, the experience of the 1930s is unlikely to be repeated, owing to the 
existence of global value chains and a multilateral framework of rules in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), and the fact that nowadays most countries have flexible exchange rates. Nevertheless, the 
protectionist measures taken in response to the crisis highlight the need to conclude the Doha Round of 
trade talks as soon as possible. 
 
The speed of the recovery that began in the region in the second half of 2009 suggests that a 
number of countries could start growing again in 2010 at rates similar to those of the pre-crisis period. 
This projection is not without short-term and medium-term risks, however, and there are doubts as to 
whether the recovery will lead to a period of sustained growth, in the region or the wider world.1 
 
In the second half of 2009, trade flows began to recover everywhere in the region except the 
Caribbean (see figure I.3). The export recovery was similar across South America and Mexico and 
Central America. The improvement in South American exports, manifested in higher volumes and prices, 
was due to continuing Chinese demand for commodities (copper, zinc, oil, wheat and soy). The recovery 
in Mexico and Central America is largely accounted for by the gradual normalization of demand and 
imports in the United States. Broadly speaking, there has also been a partial restoration of international 
trade financing flows, with a reduction in the region’s risk levels. The data for the Caribbean to the third 
quarter of 2009 did not yet show a definite upward trend. 
 
ECLAC is forecasting economic growth of some 4.1% for the region in 2010, following a 
GDP decline of 1.7% in 2009. Both figures show that the Latin America and Caribbean region 
withstood the crisis better than the industrialized economies and Central and Eastern Europe and 
is recovering sooner. The rate is expected to be higher in South America than in the other subregions, 
owing to the relatively large size of certain countries’ domestic markets (Brazil, Argentina and 
Colombia), the greater diversification of their export markets and the greater weight of China as a 
destination for a number of countries’ foreign sales (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru). Conversely, 
slower growth is expected in economies with a less diversified portfolio of trading partners that buy 
mainly manufactures, as in the case of Mexico and the Central American economies. 
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SUBREGIONS OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INDICES OF 
GOODS EXPORTS AND IMPORTS BY VALUE, 2006-2009 
(January 2006=100) 
 






























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
 
 
B.THE EVOLUTION OF THE REGION’S EXTERNAL TRADE STRUCTURE 
 
 
Intraregional trade has yet to return to its historic highs. Intraregional trade expanded steadily from 
the early 1980s onward to peak at just over 20% for Latin America and the Caribbean as a whole in the 
late 1990s and 25% in the case of MERCOSUR and the Central American Common Market. These 
increases were halted and sharply reversed from 1999, however, when the Asian financial crisis hit the 
region. Subsequently, currency upheavals in MERCOSUR and the Andean Community caused trade 
between the countries of South America to plummet. Although the intrasubregional trade ratio carried on 























































































































































































































































































































































































































LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INTRAREGIONAL TRADE, 1986-2009 






















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, Commodity 
Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
a
  Data for 2009 are projections. 
b
  The Central American Common Market data do not include maquila exports and free-trade zones.  
 
 
Intraregional trade in Latin America and the Caribbean has lagged well behind that of other regions of 
the world. The internal trade ratio in the European Union is 67%, a figure that reflects the depth of 
integration there and the density of intra-industry trade, while the indicators for the Asian economies are 
also considerably higher than those for our region (see table I.1).  
 
The regional market has a high manufacturing density. Intraregional trade is mostly based on 
manufactured goods, especially those with a high natural-resource content, and on low- and medium-
technology products (see figure I.5). Processed foods, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, plastics, household 
appliances (such as cookers, washing machines and heaters), motor vehicles and textiles are among the 
goods usually exported through intraregional trade networks. Those segments are all largely dependent on 
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LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN AND REFERENCE REGIONS: INTRAREGIONAL 
EXPORTS AND THEIR SHARE IN WORLD GOODS TRADE,  
1986-1989, 1994-1997 AND 2005-2007 
(Percentages of total exports) 
Ratio of intraregional trade 
measured by exports  
(A) = (Xintrai/XToti)*100 
 Exports within the region as a 
proportion of global exports 
(B) = (XToti/XMundo)*100  
1986-1989 1994-1997 2005-2007  1986-1989 1994-1997 2005-2007 
Andean Community 3.7 8.7 9.1  0.4 0.4 0.5 
Southern Common Market 7.7 21.9 13.8  1.5 1.4 1.6 
Central American Common 
Market 14.2 21.4 20.9  0.1 0.1 0.2 
Caribbean Community 8.1 13.2 14.2  0.2 0.1 0.2 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 13.6 20.0 18.2  3.8 4.6 5.6 
Africa 4.3 9.4 14.5  1.1 1.0 1.7 
Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations 17.9
 24.5 25.2  3.4 6.1 6.1 
European Union 64.2 65.7 67.1  41.1 39.7 38.0 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, Commodity 
Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
 
Figure I.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: COMPARISON OF INTRA-GROUP TRADE 





















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, Commodity 




















As regards the main export destinations, the region has been forging closer trade links with Asia-
Pacific and China over the past decade (see table I.2), a process that has been intensified by the signing of 
various bilateral free trade agreements and visits by business leaders, ministers and presidents. The 
corollary of the growing importance of Asia-Pacific has been a decline in the share of trade accounted for 

































MERCOSUR 32.1 28.1 19.9 10.7 24.0 21.7 9.5 20.1 3.0 9.7 
Argentina 47.2 39.1 11.4 6.9 17.8 18.7 9.1 16.2 3.6 8.6 
Brazil 23.7 22.8 24.5 12.5 27.3 23.1 9.9 22.3 2.6 5.7 
Paraguay 69.6 66.7 3.4 1.6 12.4 15.1 2.8 1.8 0.9 1.8 
Uruguay 52.7 40.6 8.5 3.5 17.6 17.4 8.5 7.6 4.5 3.5 
Andean Community c  24.3 23.4 48.7 44.8 11.5 12.5 4.2 9.5 1.1 6.3 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) d 51.2 63.9 19.2 7.2 14.0 5.8 1.2 17.6 0.4 1.1 
Colombia 32.0 28.1 47.0 38.1 14.1 13.4 2.4 2.6 0.2 1.6 
Ecuador 31.8 37.6 38.1 41.7 13.8 12.7 9.7 3.2 0.7 1.6 
Peru 19.0 18.1 26.4 16.7 24.6 16.4 16.4 25.3 6.3 13.3 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 19.4 16.9 58.2 62.3 6.6 11.4 1.3 7.6 0.2 7.3 
Central American Common Market 30.0 36.6 35.6 39.5 13.7 11.7 3.6 8.4 0.1 3.1 
Costa Rica 21.0 27.4 50.9 36.9 19.9 16.6 5.6 17.2 0.3 7.7 
El Salvador 28.6 44.0 9.3 47.3 4.0 5.2 0.3 2.6 0.0 0.0 
Guatemala 46.2 43.8 31.7 39.9 9.1 5.7 4.9 3.3 0.1 0.6 
Honduras 34.0 32.3 42.3 40.2 17.3 21.2 1.5 4.1 0.0 1.2 
Nicaragua 36.2 43.5 34.7 29.4 19.4 14.2 0.8 3.2 0.1 0.0 
Caribbean e 4.9 8.6 83.9 59.6 4.5 33.4 1.6 2.7 0.3 0.7 
Antigua and Barbuda f  37.5 27.4 23.9 23.6 19.2 10.6 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.1 
Bahamas g  4.5 4.0 13.6 69.9 77.9 12.7 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.3 
Barbados g  44.7 36.3 16.1 21.0 15.4 11.8 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.3 
Belize g  7.8 26.2 30.0 45.0 52.8 26.8 4.7 1.5 0.0 0.0 
Cuba h 9.6 20.0 40.2 0.0 0.0 9.8 8.0 0.7 4.5 0.8 
Dominica g  58.6 61.8 30.2 2.9 6.9 27.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Dominican Republic g  16.2 17.9 18.8 61.0 40.2 13.7 4.9 2.0 0.0 2.1 
Grenada g  20.9 58.5 33.4 16.3 43.5 16.1 0.2 3.9 0.0 0.6 
Guyana g  15.8 16.9 26.3 17.4 32.2 30.1 0.6 2.9 0.2 1.5 
Jamaica g  6.1 4.3 29.8 40.3 36.2 29.8 4.1 1.6 1.6 0.1 
Saint Kitts and Nevis f 5.3 6.5 22.5 86.6 68.7 3.4 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.0 
SaintLucia g  28.3 44.9 50.8 34.0 18.1 17.0 0.9 0.9 0.2 0.6 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines g  50.0 83.9 43.0 3.9 2.6 9.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Suriname g  4.2 12.6 6.7 1.3 1.8 14.7 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.9 
Trinidad and Tobago g 37.4 29.0 10.2 46.0 44.3 14.3 2.1 2.7 0.0 0.1 
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Mexico 3.7 6.8 87.2 80.3 3.5 5.6 1.5 3.5 0.2 0.8 
Other i 23.0 20.9 18.8 12.4 25.1 24.0 23.1 38.0 5.1 16.7 
Chile 22.9 20.9 17.6 11.9 25.3 23.9 24.0 38.5 5.3 16.9 
Panama 24.0 16.9 46.7 40.1 20.3 29.2 1.9 5.3 0.3 3.6 
Latin America and the Caribbean 16.6 21.9 57.0 36.8 12.0 15.8 5.3 13.5 1.3 5.9 
Source: 2000 and 2001 data: United Nations, Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE); 2008 and 2009 data: national figures. China 
data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia in 2009: International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction of Trade Statistics. 
Caribbean data for Asia-Pacific and China in 2008-2009 actually relate to 2007-2008 and are from United Nations, 
Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
a
  Includes ASEAN, Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand and Republic of Korea.  
b
  2009 figures are up to September.  
c
  2008 includes Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for statistical consistency with 2000, even though the agreement had been 
repudiated by that time.  
d
  The 2009 data for the Plurinaitonal State of Bolivia are for January-June.  
e
  Constructed using mirror statistics and data available in COMTRADE.  
f
  The 2008-2009 data refer to 2007.  
g
  The 2008-2009 data refer to 2008.  
h
  The 2008-2009 data refer to 2006. 
i
  Includes Chile and Panama.  
 
 
For decades there was also a tendency for Latin American exports, particularly those of 
Mexico and Central America, to become more diverse and sophisticated in terms of technology 
content. This tendency ended with the beginning of the commodity price boom in 2003 (see 
figure I.6). From then until 2008, the external sales of commodity exporters went slightly backwards in 
terms of diversification and technology content. In 2008, the product exports of all subregions and 
countries were more diversified, with the exception of the Andean countries, Chile and Panama. Exports 
are generally more concentrated as regards destinations than as regards products, although diversification 
took place between 1990 and 2008. The exception is Mexico, which is highly dependent on a single 






LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORT CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 (a) Diversification (b) Technology intensity 
















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations, Commodity 
Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
a
  The Herfindahl-Hirschmann index has a range of 0 to 1 and indicates the degree of diversification of a country’s exports to a 
particular destination; from 0 to 0.10 indicates a diversified structure and from 0.10 to 0.18 moderate concentration, while a 
score over 0.18 indicates that exports are concentrated among a few products or destinations. 
b Includes Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.  
c
  Does not include Haiti.  
d
  Includes Chile and Panama. 
 
 
C. THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE POST-CRISIS SCENARIO 
 
 
The crisis may have heightened some of the initial challenges involved in the integration of Latin 
America and the Caribbean with the global economy, namely: the intensity of technological change, the 
greater weight of China and other emerging economies and the challenge of climate change. Moreover, 
the depth of the international economic crisis has made the reform of financial regulation and the 
functioning of the international financial system itself an absolute necessity. 
 
 
1. Macroeconomic scenarios 
 
For the coming years, projections of the world economy are tending to converge around a “new 
norm”, characterized by the following elements: (i) the economies of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) will see their potential rates of growth reduced and may even grow 
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trade will grow more slowly than it did in the expansionary cycle from 2003 to 2007.2 While the trade of 
the industrialized countries will grow slowly, that of China and Asia will probably be more dynamic, 
although it will not match the rates of recent years; (iii) protectionist measures applied because of the 
crisis will persist rather than being rapidly dismantled as economies gradually recover their levels of 
activity; and (iv) there will be excess capacity in a number of production sectors. As a result of all this, 
limited international demand will increase competitive pressures on the supply side. 
 
Fiscal and financial considerations support the above diagnosis. They suggest that there is 
still a great deal of adjustment ahead for the portfolios of families and financial institutions in 
industrialized economies, particularly the United States, if they are to clean up their balance sheets and 
borrow less or even pay off debt.3 This suggests that import demand in these economies will be curtailed, 
which means the world economy will have to find new engines of demand. China and the other emerging 
economies have yet to match the weight of the industrialized economies in the evolution of global 
demand and as markets for world exports. Although the relative weight of emerging economies in the 
global economy and trade is expected to carry on increasing, this will not be enough to offset the loss of 
dynamism in the United States and Europe. In any event, this rebalancing of world trade highlights the 
growing importance of South-South trade.4 
 
China, India and the rest of Asia will become the main source of growth for exports from 
Latin America and the Caribbean in the coming years. Economies that are exporters of natural 
resources, like those of South America, have been less affected by the crisis because the high growth rate 
of China has sustained international demand for such commodities. In the case of Mexico and Central 
America, competition with Chinese manufactures in the United States market is more intense, and this 
could accelerate structural change in certain industries, especially maquila. 
 
International financing will be harder to obtain in the next few years. The drastic decline in 
accumulated wealth throughout the world, but especially in the industrialized countries, turned a situation 
of virtually endless low-risk liquidity into one of limited liquidity with variable risks. The link between 
financial flows and production and external trade flows will have to be redefined. The reduction in global 
liquidity will lead to a decline in capital flows to Latin America and the Caribbean and other developing 
regions. Furthermore, the large financing needs of OECD governments will compete with those of 
developing countries. It is possible that some new factors, such as the sovereign wealth funds of emerging 
economies and the internationalization of Chinese firms, will come to play an even more important role in 
the de facto architecture of international finance, given the large amount of liquidity built up by Chinese 
firms and banks and oil economies on the one hand, and the low yields of United States Treasury 
securities on the other. 
 
                                                     
2
  In its World Economic Outlook update of January 2010, the International Monetary Fund projected 5.8% growth 
in the volume of world trade in 2010. The OECD projected a slightly higher growth of 6% in its Economic 
Outlook report of November 2009. 
3
  By 2011, the public debt of the OECD member countries is expected to be in excess of 100% of GDP, as 
compared to 70% in 2007 (OECD, 2009). 
4
  According to WTO figures, South-South trade accounted for 46% of developing countries’ exports and 54% of 
their imports, respectively (WTO, 2009). 
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2. Innovation and technological change: two key challenges 
 
The current technology shock is redefining the competitive outlook for a very large number of 
production sectors. This technology shock consists in multiple convergence of information and 
communications technologies, biotechnology and a number of general-purpose technologies such as 
nanotechnology and the development of new materials and renewable energy sources. All these 
technologies are convergent and are resulting in profound transformations in production and services, 
driving major innovations in processes, products and business models. The countries that best capture and 
adapt to the challenges and opportunities generated by this technological dynamic will be best placed to 
benefit from the opportunities globalization offers. 
 
The crisis will intensify processes of production restructuring and will have an impact on 
competitiveness. Tighter international financing will affect investment, especially in sectors where 
investment is long-term, such as energy and mining, and in areas that require a high level of investment to 
stay at the forefront of technological progress, like some manufactures. The crisis caught a number of 
sectors with excess capacity, so weaker demand will hasten corporate consolidations, mergers and 
acquisitions. The incentive to purchase cheap assets —whose value has been eroded by the crisis— is 
generating good opportunities for those who can raise the necessary financing. The post-crisis period will 
thus be characterized by greater economic concentration, and competition policies will become more 
important in domestic economies and in world trade. 
 
The business models applied to production and foreign trade need updating. In a global 
context of flagging international trade and external financing, greater competitive pressures and rising 
protectionism, the typical reaction of firms is to cut costs, postpone investment, shorten their decision-
making horizon and try to protect their main markets and customers. This reasonable defensive reaction and 
the process of weighing the new opportunities than may arise should, however, be accompanied by a 
reformulation of the long-term business model. Detecting and seizing on new opportunities and using the 
new technological and business organization tools could help to redefine firms’ competitive advantages. 
Outsourcing or offshoring to maintain the status quo is less attractive than deploying these tools in a 
forward-looking business strategy. As a result of the crisis, global and regional value chains will need to be 
redefined on the basis of different economies’ capacity to recover from the crisis, of access to scarce raw 
materials, of a renewed emphasis on geographical or logistical advantages such as proximity to the main 
centres of consumption, or of the existence of a critical mass of human resources in specific technological 
environments. Looking beyond the obvious differences between firms and countries, the latter should also 
reformulate their competitive strategies to adapt to the demands of the new post-crisis world. 
 
There is a tendency for production to be organized around global value chains. This involves 
fragmenting production processes geographically by taking advantage of the increasing digitalization of 
many activities, the growing internationalization and commercialization of services and reductions in 
transport and logistics costs. Firms are increasingly operating globally, acting as a unit and in real time 
thanks to a network of interconnections. Technological progress is bringing with it new forms of 
industrial and geographical organization. Some firms move part of their production abroad, an activity 
known as offshoring or near-shoring (in the case of a nearby country) that leads to a new form of 
corporate organization known as “extended organization” in which the parent company exercises strict 
oversight of services transferred abroad. Other developments that have increased in importance in recent 
years are outsourcing and insourcing, the latter involving subcontractors being brought into the firm that 
is sourcing the work. Besides technological developments, this process has been supported by the 




The increasing integration of national economies in this global context is generating an array 
of opportunities and threats for firms, sectors, countries and regions, depending on how they read this 
context and prepare themselves to deal with it. In any case, it is clear that the future performance of 
countries will increasingly depend on their ability to absorb new techno-economic paradigms creatively. 
Innovation and new technologies offer unprecedented opportunities to close the gap with the industrialized 
countries. However, this requires a considerable internal effort to enhance a country’s human resource base 
and presence in international technological innovation and business networks, thereby orienting the 
production and export structure towards more innovation- and knowledge-intensive activities. 
 
How successfully countries participate in these chains will depend on the progress they 
make with systemic competitiveness, i.e., the extent to which they deliberately and systematically 
incorporate technical progress into production activities in the quest both to increase productivity (to close 
the productivity gap with the industrialized economies) and to narrow excessive productivity differences 
between different companies and sectors, i.e., reduce the domestic productivity and income gaps that 
underlie the structural heterogeneity and inequalities of the region. Competitiveness is systemic because 
the effort to transform production needs to include the whole system within which companies operate: 
infrastructure, technology, energy and transport, the education system, relations between employers and 
employees, the public and private institutional apparatus and the financial network. The systemic 
character of competitiveness makes it necessary to work towards integration of the production system and 
progressive homogenization of productivity levels. 
 
Regional cooperation is crucial when it comes to improving competitiveness, since the scale 
of these tasks exceeds national capabilities in a number of areas. Greater cooperation would make it 
possible to combine efforts to achieve the levels of quality, scale and productivity the global economy 
requires. Accordingly, the region’s countries could benefit from regional forums for dialogue allowing 
them to share successful experiences with innovation, competitiveness and social cohesion between 
public and private actors. 
 
 
3. The growing weight of China and other emerging economies 
 
Another tendency that will continue in the coming decades is the increasing weight of China and 
India, along with some other major emerging economies, as global actors in the international economy, 
trade and finance. Thus, the centre of world output and trade growth is shifting from the Atlantic to the 
Pacific. In 2009, China became the world’s second-largest economy after the United States in purchasing 
power parity terms and the third-largest behind the United States and Japan in current dollar terms. Many 
other indicators also illustrate the enormous weight acquired by the Chinese economy in the first decade 
of this century.5 On the basis of some projections, China and India will be two of the world’s three largest 
economies by 2050, while these two economies plus Brazil and the Russian Federation will be larger than 
today’s Group of Seven (G-7) by the early 2030s. 
 
China and Asia are also increasing their share of world trade with great speed and 
accounting for a growing proportion of global industrial output. In the first half of 2009, China overtook 
Germany to become the world’s largest exporter. Furthermore, Asia and the Pacific together account for 
                                                     
5
  Between 2000 and 2008, China accounted for almost 30% of world GDP growth and 40% of the global rise in 
oil consumption. The country is now the world’s largest consumer of aluminium, copper, tin, soy and zinc and 
the second-largest consumer of sugar and oil. In 2009 it held 29% of the world’s total reserves, and it is the 
largest holder of United States Treasury securities. 
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about a quarter of world trade. China is at the heart of what is known as “factory Asia”, a complex 
network of regional supply chains served by transnational enterprises. In fact, China, Japan, the Republic 
of Korea and the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are one of the 
world’s most important centres of intra-industry trade.6 These chains were constructed as a result of the 
unilateral liberalization of trade in parts and components, along with foreign direct investment (FDI) 
flows stimulated by a favourable investment climate. The growth of intra-Asian trade is both cause and 
consequence of the increasing degree of trade complementarity between the economies participating in it. 
 
 
4. Climate change 
 
In addition to its social and human effects, climate change is affecting production and international 
trade through various channels. Climate change is manifesting itself in a variety of ways (temperature 
changes, increasing water shortages, a rising sea level and the rising frequency of extreme weather 
events), affecting the productivity of the agricultural sector and the competitive advantages of nations, the 
infrastructure of trade (ports, airports and bridges), trade routes and tourism. In addition, increasing 
awareness of environmental issues among consumers and firms is creating new parameters in 
international trade that could give rise to restrictions on the use of certain critical resources (such as 
hydrocarbons) as well as political pressure to deal with environmental bottlenecks, increasing the private 
and public cost of investment. 
 
Another way in which climate change might affect trade is through the adoption of 
unilateral trade measures on the argument that they are needed to combat it. This happened in 2009, 
with the discussion of a number of initiatives in various industrialized countries such as the United States 
and France. References to so-called “green protectionism” have become popular as a result. The modest 
results achieved at the fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (COP 15), held in Copenhagen in December 2009, make it more likely 
that unilateral initiatives such as those mentioned will increase in number over the coming years. This 
creates large potential risks for the access of the region’s exports to industrialized-country markets, 
highlighting the urgent need for a multilateral agreement on the issue. 
 
International trade also affects climate change. First, the shift of production activities from 
industrialized countries to developing ones could increase or reduce emissions, depending on energy 
efficiency levels in the two and on the additional emissions generated by trade-related international 
transportation. Second, international trade facilitates the spread of technological goods and services that 
mitigate climate change. Third, trade affects the environment through changes in volume (scale), structure 
(composition) and the use of cleaner production methods (technology). 
 
It is imperative to include the issue of climate change on national and regional agendas for 
growth, competitiveness and innovation. Henceforth, it will be the only way to reconcile growth and 
competitiveness with progress on equity and better environmental standards. Section V of the present 
document presents some specific proposals for this area. 
                                                     
6
  ASEAN includes the following 10 countries: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. ASEAN is at the heart of a 
range of trade initiatives that could come to fruition over the coming years. The most important of these, besides 
the agreement between China and ASEAN, which has been in force since January 2010, are ASEAN+3, 
covering the 10 ASEAN economies plus Japan, the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China, and 
ASEAN+6, which would add Australia, India and New Zealand to the aforementioned countries. 
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II. MORE AND BETTER REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE CONTEXT 
OF AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX INTERNATIONAL AGENDA 
 
 
The international agenda is becoming more complex because of fragile macroeconomic and financial 
conditions, weakness of global institutions and the emergence of new issues and stakeholders. These 
factors are eroding the relevance of multilateral institutions, but without offering yet other effective 
alternatives that address the new challenges of this century. Establishing spaces for dialogue and regional 
cooperation is therefore both urgent and called for. These would not only enable diagnoses to be 
sharpened and shared, but also enable the countries of the region to participate in global forums with a 
unified position and thus better defend the region’s interests. 
 
 
A. FRAGILE MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
 
 
The most recent projections indicate that in 2010-2011 the world economy is expected to resume annual 
growth of about 4% as it makes its way out of the worst international economic crisis in 80 years. The 
recovery, however, is expected to be somewhat unbalanced, with industrialized countries growing by 
close to 2%, on average, while emerging and developing economies will grow by about 6%. A wide 
disparity is expected in the recovery of developing economies. Asian economies are expected to grow at 
about 8% annually, whereas Latin America and the Caribbean, the developing region that has the slowest 
growth, will only grow at half that rate (IMF, 2010).  
 
The industrialized economies are recovering with less zeal and still rely critically on the fiscal, 
monetary and financial measures that were put in place to counter the crisis. Though there is no evidence 
that private demand has recovered, the financial markets are heating up again, and once again are 
distancing themselves dangerously from the real markets. The appetite for risk and big gains in the stock 
markets are returning, though urgent financial reforms, which seemed so obvious and consensual at the 
end of 2008, have not been addressed yet. There are also growing concerns about the fiscal sustainability 
of industrialized economies, with their double-digit fiscal deficits (as a percentage of GDP) and with 
public debt burdens that are greater than their GDP.  
 
So, in 2010-2011, the industrialized economies will face complex challenges such as the 
following: (i) deciding exactly when and how to remove the fiscal, monetary and financial stimuli without 
damaging the recovery, which is still anaemic; (ii) restoring the balance sheets of families and financial 
institutions, particularly in the United States; (iii) controlling and gradually reducing the fiscal deficit and 
public debt; and (iv) implementing regulatory controls on banks and financial institutions so as to prevent 
the recurrence of crises as deep as this most recent one. 
 
These formidable challenges will have to be addressed in a context of slower growth and 
unemployment rates of about 10% in Europe and the United States, and with lingering protectionist 





B. WEAKNESS OF GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
 
The 2008-2009 crisis made clear that global institutions were unprepared to face the new challenges of 
this century. The G-7 was probably one of the main victims of the crisis when it became evident that all 
its members had substantial roles in the financial crisis and subsequent worldwide recession and that any 
solution to the crisis would inevitably involve bringing new actors to the negotiating table, especially 
those from emerging economies. The shift from the G-7 to a new G-20 is a clear expression of how the 
world economy is being reshaped.  
 
The delayed responses to the crisis of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank —and their failure to prevent it— highlighted the need to reform these institutions, not only to 
enhance their effectiveness, but also to ensure that they better serve the interests of developing countries. 
Also, the difficulties in resuming negotiations in the Doha Round, which began in late 2001, and the 
frustrating outcome of the Copenhagen conference on climate change remove all doubt that global 
institutions are incapable of handling the forces that are being unleashed through globalization and 
technological change. It is no longer enough to build institutions that oversee the globalization of 
economies, trade and finance, a task that in itself is already quite complex. Today's challenges also 
include handling public health issues and pandemics, migration, climate change and environmental 
conservation, not to mention the fights against terrorism, drugs and organized crime.  
 
 
C. PROGRESS IN REGIONAL COOPERATION: AN INDISPENSABLE INGREDIENT 
 
 
The scenario described above heightens the importance of finding a unified voice that advocates on behalf 
of the interests of the region in a timely and effective manner within the various international forums that 
deal with the complex agenda of development and multilateralism of the twenty-first century. Experience 
shows that every time multilateralism is not up to the task of addressing this agenda, it ends up being 
addressed unilaterally or regionally, in those cases where communities are structured to do so, as Europe 
has done, for example, regarding certain issues. If the Latin American and Caribbean region fails to find a 
unified voice, the region's countries may arrive late and ill-prepared to the debates, miss out on 
opportunities and find themselves faced with complex situations that even further limit the region’s 
prospects for development. 
 
Thus, it is important that progress be made in organizing unified regional bodies that would 
enable Latin America and the Caribbean to frame timely and proactive responses to international 
challenges. This would also strengthen engagement between the region and other actors in the 
international community and would more effectively promote regional interests in global forums. A 
corollary need is for the various subregional bodies and institutions to improve their own cooperation and 





D. MOUNTING DEMAND FOR POLICY COORDINATION 
 
 
Convergence is a complex task that cannot be resolved in the short term; however it is possible to create 
conditions that increase its feasibility, particularly if convergence evolves in tandem with the region’s 
advances in public policies. In order to apply the lessons learned from previous crises and take advantage 
of the opportunities arising in the wake of the most recent one, the Governments of the region should, for 
example, aim to produce coordinated, participatory and mutually informed policy responses (Velasco, 
2009). In particular, policies should be coordinated in the following areas: 
 
• Gradual and persistent progress in countercyclical fiscal policies, since the absence of 
coordination reduces incentives to continue advancing in that direction. 
 
• Financial regulation, since lack of coordination allows room for regulatory arbitrage. The 
need to improve financial regulation and maintain exchange-rate flexibility is another lesson 
learned from earlier crises.  
 
• Re-establishment of capital flows, combining access to external financing with measures to 
deepen domestic capital markets.  
 
• Avoidance of protectionism, particularly between countries of the region. 
 
• Provision of trade financing, especially for intraregional trade.  
 
• Strengthening of international financial institutions, giving them enhanced capital 
endowments and the capacity to lend quickly in order to stave off balance-of-payments crises, 
and of regional financial institutions, promoting capitalization and greater complementarity 
with development banks.  
 
• Increase investment in economic infrastructure and national and regional logistics services. 
This would not only help reactivate the economy through countercyclical programmes that 
have lasting medium- and long-term outcomes, but would also improve the region's capacity 





E. URGENT NEED FOR GREATER COOPERATION 
TO INCREASE COMPETITIVENESS 
 
 
Beyond containing the fallout from the current crisis, greater cooperation is needed to improve the 
region’s position in the world economy. This implies dealing with the challenges of productive 
complementarity, competitiveness and innovation, which will certainly play a greater role in the well-
being of the population in the medium and long terms. The consequences of losing the global 
competitiveness race would be much worse than the effects of the current crisis which, harsh as they may 
be, will be temporary (Rosales, 2009). Lags in competitiveness, innovation and productivity, on the other 
hand, represent permanent obstacles to progress in growth-with-equity strategies. Cooperation on 




F. REGIONAL INTEGRATION AS THE BEST OPTION 
 
 
Regional integration offers the opportunity to broaden national markets and production scales and to 
promote trade in services and intraregional investments. It also helps SMEs owing to their larger relative 
weight in intraregional trade, and stimulates diversification of production by supporting exports with 
higher value added and manufacturing content. Regional integration can also encourage the formation of 
regional value chains and constitutes a learning platform which can lead to improved competitiveness at 
the worldwide level (ECLAC, 1994).  
 
The traditional arguments in favour of integration are reinforced by needs arising out of the 
current phase of globalization, such as the need to create strategic international partnerships in production, 
logistics, marketing, investment and technology. In order to achieve growth with equity in the present-day 
world, countries now need expanded markets, legal certainty and the convergence of standards and 
disciplines, together with progress in infrastructure, energy and connectivity and integration into global 
value networks. 
 
The Latin American and Caribbean region has come a long way in freeing up intraregional trade, 
especially in goods. Major challenges remain, however, which must be tackled if the region is to move 
towards the formation of a regional expanded market. The most significant of these include convergence 
in the tariff-reduction schemes agreed upon in the framework of the various subregional agreements and 
the need to strengthen commitments in areas such as services, investment and government procurement, 
in which the region’s negotiating experience is more recent and therefore more limited. 
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COMPETITION POLICY COOPERATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
 
Subregional cooperation on competition policy has been strengthened by the creation of the Negotiating Group on 
Competition Policy as part of the Central American integration process. The Group comprises the highest 
competition authorities of each country and its purpose is to design activities of subregional scope that enhance the 
operations of the agencies engaged in promoting competition. In a context of free trade agreements with important 
mega-markets (the United States and the European Union, with which negotiations are currently under way), the 
subregion has been learning that uncompetitive practices in domestic markets can cancel out the effects of trade 
liberalization, making it necessary to adopt further-reaching approaches that integrate tariff reductions with the 
promotion of competition and consumer protection. Equally, more competitive and transparent markets are 
conducive to innovation and higher productivity. 
The importance of such cooperation between the countries of the Central American isthmus is great 
because, as small, adjoining countries, they often experience monopolistic practices by companies operating in some 
or all of them. These countries frequently find it necessary to investigate such companies, which means committing 
scarce resources to identifying and demonstrating anticompetitive practices by some firm that has already been 
investigated in a neighbouring country. The opportunity to share information or even carry out joint investigations in 
the future could greatly enhance the capacity of national competition agencies. 
Meanwhile, there has been a tendency for competition laws to converge: they have tended to become more 
comprehensive as many of the most effective exceptions that used to exist have been removed, especially with the 
strengthening of competition agencies. In the future, there is likely to be further harmonization of the legal 
framework for competition to facilitate joint action by the countries. This would benefit all Central American 
nations, as it would prevent large firms from engaging in regulatory arbitrage by taking advantage of laxer 
competition legislation in certain countries. 
 





III. RENEWING INTEGRATION WITH REALISTIC COMMITMENTS 
 
 
All the integration schemes in Latin America and the Caribbean show progress in a number of important 
respects. For example, MERCOSUR has made a noteworthy contribution to the creation of peaceful 
conditions and democratic stability in the subregion. Advances in the institutional structure of the Andean 
Community, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Central American Integration System 
(SICA) are such that they can now undertake new tasks made possible, precisely, by their institutional 
maturity. These integration schemes have created a sense of belonging, as well as political, business and 
academic links which can serve as the basis for undertaking new challenges.  
 
Notwithstanding this progress, there are some shortfalls in fulfilment of commitments —in the 
area of trade, for example— and a number of lags in respect of the countries’ own expectations of the 
integration schemes. The challenge for the integration schemes is to achieve renovation in a way that 
improves the region’s international integration. 
 
Highly disperse efforts have led to a proliferation of regional and subregional integration 
mechanisms and bodies in Latin America and the Caribbean. This diversity of integration and cooperation 
bodies is partly the result of the wide array of issues that fall under integration, including policy, 
economics, trade, infrastructure and interconnectivity. Nevertheless, at the very least, channels of 
communication and convergence must be established among these different schemes in order to harness 
potential synergies and minimize duplication of efforts.  
 
Now is the time to enhance the complementariness between efforts aimed at integration into the 
world economy and regional or subregional integration schemes. The region needs to advance towards 
deeper integration that is characterized by shared disciplines, legal certainty and joint initiatives in 
infrastructure, energy and connectivity, including cooperation on trade facilitation, logistics and 
technological partnerships like those that are forming in the Asia-Pacific region.  
 
Deeper integration in the framework of open regionalism will promote competitiveness because 
integration into the main world markets will be complemented by the stimulus of intraregional trade and 
the share of SMEs in export flows will rise. This would not only promote trade within the region but 
would also help to attract FDI and create “trans-Latin” corporations. Integration would thus begin to pay 
off its old debts in terms of contributing to the region's development and competitiveness.  
 
Integration can be strengthened in several ways. The most demanding is to create a common 
market, including policy convergence and community institutions. While the gradual and realistic 
establishment of incremental goals can contribute to progress in that direction, the current challenge is 
much more modest: to protect what already exists, comply with commitments entered into and build 
bridges of convergence between the various subregional groups. A pragmatic revision of the existing 
agreements and the establishment of a realistic timetable for effective compliance, including the 
incorporation of community agreements into national legislation, would do more than anything else to 
boost economic actors’ confidence in integration. 
 
Another option would be to develop the region’s physical integration, which, in addition to 
solving issues related to physical connectivity, would foster intraregional trade, stimulate the 
reorganization of production chains and act as a catalyst to regional integration processes. Obviously, 
there is an urgent need to move forwards on this, and to do so does not necessarily require progress in 




 ECLAC is driven by conviction and doctrine to affirm the need for regional integration, and has 
done so at length in a great number of publications. But even in the favourable years —politically and 
economically speaking— of 2003-2007, too little progress was made on integration, and particular 
difficulties arose in South America. 
 
 As a result, a number of strategic issues arise: 
 
• Recognizing diversity among the subregions 
 
 Mexico and Central America, on the one hand, and South America, on the other, are clearly at 
different places as regards integration and trade initiatives, with the first generally much more open to 
international trade and trade agreements. The situation in the Caribbean differs even more. Given the 
scale and diversity of problems, the most appropriate integration strategy is necessarily different for each 
subregion. Even while upholding the ideal of Latin American and Caribbean integration, it must be 
acknowledged that analyses and proposals need to be differentiated if they are to be effective. From this 
viewpoint, ECLAC proposes increased flexibility in regional integration processes and acceptance of 
schemes that vary in shape and size, differing speeds of implementation and multiple types of 
relationships as a function of the issues involved, while affording priority to the goal of integration in the 
medium and long terms. 
 
• Acknowledging political obstacles 
 
 There is a long list of high-level political conflicts among the Governments of the region, in some 
of which the parties have had recourse to international tribunals outside the region. It is obviously 
difficult for progress to be made on integration policies in these circumstances.  
 
To be realistic, it must be recognized that the lack of progress in the areas of infrastructure and 
energy is not solely a matter of economic constraints. There are considerable political differences 
concerning the meaning of these initiatives and until those are tackled and resolved, it will be hard to 
achieve more satisfactory progress. 
 
 It is important to create awareness that integration cannot be limited to countries which share 
ideological affinities. Rather, integration is a matter of finding the lowest common denominator which 
will serve the various national interests involved. By definition, it transcends Governments, since it must 
become a State policy. 
 
• Building areas of convergence, accepting diversity 
 
 South America shows a broad range of international integration modalities. These clearly reflect 
conceptual discrepancies in the approach to trade, integration, innovation and competitiveness, in sum, on 
how to approach the challenge of globalization. It would be unrealistic to pretend that these differences do not 
exist or that they are likely to disappear in the short term. The challenge of integration in the modern world 
requires that these differences be understood and accepted, and that priority be given to forums for dialogue 
and convergence that enable progress based on concrete initiatives and interests shared by all parties. Also 
needed now is more collective and flexible leadership, according to the issues under consideration. 
 




 The areas of cooperation which arouse the greatest interest, such as infrastructure, energy, 
connectivity, logistics, aid for trade and trade facilitation, are very much territorially driven. Making those 
links clear will open up even greater scope for coordination initiatives between subnational governments 
whose geographical proximity may dictate a greater interest in joint projects with neighbouring provinces 
in other countries than in centralized projects in which they would have only a minor role. In the region 
there are numerous subnational joint initiatives in export and FDI promotion, twinning of local 
governments and cross-border production programmes. Given the greater flexibility of subnational 
governments, they are well placed to pilot cooperation projects in energy efficiency, renewable energy 
sources, environmental technology and climate change. 
 
Despite all of the economic and political challenges that have already been mentioned, some 
major subregional connectivity projects have been improving the physical integration of the infrastructure 
for transport and related services (see box III.1).  
 
• Applying programmatic realism 
 
 A larger dose of programmatic realism should lead to greater value being attached to existing 
efforts —for example, current intraregional preferences and the development of the trans-Latins— and to 
greater realism in setting objectives for regional integration. Integration is typically viewed in the light of 
the European experience, in which the surrender of degrees of sovereignty has enabled the creation of a 
single-currency economic union and free movement of goods, services and factors of production, as well 
as strong community institutions. Apparently, the time has come to recognize that the region’s integration 
model is far removed from the European one and will remain so for a long time. This in no way signifies 
that the region should renounce goals as ambitious as those attained in Europe. What it does mean is that 
proposals for integration in the region should be consistent with the real strengths and weaknesses of the 
existing integration schemes. The European route is not necessarily the only way to move forward on 
regional integration, and the sooner the realities of Latin American and Caribbean integration are made 
explicit, the easier it will be to agree on the road towards deepening it. 
 
• The need for leadership 
 
Obviously, an undertaking of the size described here –especially, on the heels of decades of 
attempts– requires special leadership. It is clear immediately, from the numbers, that Brazil and Mexico 
would have to play an important role in any effort of this type. Brazil alone accounts for one third of the 
region’s GDP and one third of the region’s population. Brazil and Mexico together account for half of any 
relevant economic variable in the region. Brazil generates 37% of the region's total exports to Asia and 
the European Union; while Mexico accounts for 64% of all exports from the region to the United States. 
These two countries would therefore play a decisive role in any regional strategies for dialogue and 






PROGRESS WITH PHYSICAL INTEGRATION IN THE REGION: 
THE ROLE OF INFRASTRUCTURE 
 
Regional integration can be viewed in at least three dimensions: economic and trade integration, political integration 
and physical integration. The first two of these have been thoroughly aired and analysed, but not so physical 
integration, which has often escaped analysis despite the considerable progress made in this area. 
The main arguments in favour of region-level physical integration will now be summarized: 
 • it turns economic, trade and political integration into a reality (without infrastructure, none of these 
would be possible); 
 • it allows countries to find joint solutions to shared problems, such as physical bottlenecks, missing 
sections in communication systems, barriers to trade, etc. It stimulates the creation or reorganization of 
production chains, facilitates a more competitive role in global and regional markets, encourages the 
harmonization of public policies and regulatory frameworks between countries and sectors, fosters the 
development of geographically isolated areas, nurtures decentralized development and reduces trade 
and distribution costs, among other things; 
 • it is essential to improve social equity and reduce asymmetries between countries by stimulating 
regional and local development; 
 • it fosters long-term initiatives that benefit all countries participating, and this in turn helps to extend 
the planning horizon beyond short-term political cycles; 
 • it gives local governments and the private sector the opportunity to participate in decision-making and 
become involved in promoting, financing, building or operating physical integration infrastructure. 
At least three current initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean incorporate regional physical 
integration planning: Regional Infrastructure Integration in South America (IIRSA), the Meso-America Project (PM) 
in Central America and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in the Caribbean. In the first case, progress has 
been made in implementing the physical integration infrastructure projects in a portfolio agreed upon by the 12 
countries of South America (514 projects worth US$ 69 billion in the fields of transport, energy and 
communications, although the first of these predominates, accounting for almost 60% of the total). By early 2009, 
concrete progress had been made with 68% of IIRSA projects: 10% had been completed, 38% were being 
implemented and 20% were in active preparation. The initiative has also made progress with the structuring of 
methodological tools for the analysis of production process integration, logistical services development and 
environmental and social assessment. 
The Meso-America Project (formerly Puebla-Panama Plan) can show substantial progress, such as the 
International Network of Meso-American Highways (RICAM), designed to improve the internal and external 
connectivity of the region’s economies by building, rehabilitating and maintaining 13,132 km of highways, the 
River Hondo international bridge (Mexico-Belize), the La Amistad border crossing bridge (El Salvador-Honduras), 
the international bridge over the River Sixaola (Costa Rica-Panama) and a new international bridge between El 
Salvador and Guatemala. Other major initiatives are being developed in the fields of energy integration (the 
Electricity Interconnection System for the Countries of Central America-SIEPAC), information and communication 
technologies (the Meso-American Information Highway-AMI) and modernization of customs and border crossings 
(the Meso-American Procedure for International Goods Traffic-TIM). 
In the case of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), a Community Transport Policy has been agreed 
upon and progress was made during 2009 in establishing the Infrastructure Fund for the Caribbean to finance 
transport, energy and information and communication technology projects. Another project of importance to 
Caribbean regional integration involves a study of intraregional air transport costs and the establishment of the 
Caribbean Aviation Safety and Security Oversight System (CASSOS). 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), “Infraestructura física e integración regional”, 





THE ECONOMIC WEIGHT OF BRAZIL AND MEXICO IN THE REGION, 2008 
(Percentages) 
Exports 
 Population GDP Agriculture a Manufacturing a Services b Total 
Brazil 34 30 22 23 26 23 
Mexico 19 27 16 44 16 31 
Andean countries c 22 15 38 9 10 19 
Caribbean countries d 7 5 3 4 12 5 
Central America e 7 4 2 4 13 4 
Southern Cone f 12 19 18 17 23 18 
Latin America and the Caribbean 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total (millions of dollars) 570  2 804 477  339 926 534 080 115 116 989 122  
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Balance of Payments Statistics and United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
a
  Data for Antigua and Barbuda, Honduras, Nicaragua and Saint Kitts and Nevis are for 2007. 
b
  Data for Trinidad and Tobago are for 2007. 
c
  Includes the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
d
 Includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
e
  Includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. 
f
  Includes Argentina, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay 
 
Figure III.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: STRUCTURE OF REGIONAL EXPORTS 
TO VARIOUS DESTINATION MARKETS, 2008 
(Percentages) 
 
















Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), Balance of Payments Statistics and United Nations Commodity Trade Database (COMTRADE). 
a
  Includes ASEAN, China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. 
b
  Includes the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
c
  Includes Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, the Dominican 
Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saint Lucia, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
d
  Includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama. 
e
























It is also clearly possible —and even necessary— to create flexible leadership systems that can 
adapt to the issues and stages through which regional cooperation and integration pass. However, it is 
unquestionable that Brazil and Mexico play pivotal roles in building these new spaces for regional 
cooperation and convergence. To this end, any initiatives Mexico can spearhead in the Meso-American 
subregion, and any Brazil can spearhead in South America could further progress in those areas in which 
geographic proximity can make a significant difference. The subsequent regional convergence of the two 
processes would be less complex if the issues have been first addressed at the subregional level.  
 
Brazil’s recent economic performance, its energy finds and policies, its progress in narrowing 
inequalities and the strength of its corporations that invest abroad mean that the country has been playing 
an increasingly larger role on the international scene. This is reflected in Brazil’s participation in the new 
G-20 (in addition to its creation of the other G-20 that represents agriculture exporters in WTO 
negotiations), the consolidation of the dialogue among the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russian Federation, 
India and China), the country’s strong presence in the climate change talks and the strategic character it 
has been working into its relationships with the United States, the European Union and China. This is 
excellent news for regional cooperation because, for the first time, one of the countries of the region has 
access to the major global forums. With Argentina and Mexico also members of the new G-20, this means 
that regional positions on issues related to the global agenda need to be formulated with unprecedented 
urgency, given that these positions can now become part of the major international debate. If these 
positions are formulated responsibly and with full knowledge of the facts, Latin America and the 
Caribbean could take advantage of this situation to give an enormous boost to their capacity for 
integration and development. 
 





IV. OPTIONS FOR CONVERGENCE WITH REGARD TO 
THE REGIONAL TRADE AGENDA 
 
 
Technical proposals for furthering trade convergence among South America’s integration schemes have 
been on the table for some years. In 2006, in compliance with a mandate handed down by the Heads of 
State and Government of the then South American Community of Nations (SACN) in September 2005 to 
pursue the gradual establishment of a South American free trade area, the secretariats of the 
MERCOSUR, the Andean Community, and the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) drafted 
several proposals for trade convergence.8 
 
The proposals address a wide range of the trade issues covered by the integration schemes: tariff 
reduction; rules of origin; customs valuation and special customs regimes; trade remedies; non–tariff 
measures; technical barriers to trade; sanitary and phytosanitary measures; trade in services; investment; 
intellectual property; competition policies; government procurement; and dispute settlement (see 
table IV.1 for a summary of the proposals as well as for complementary proposals prepared by ECLAC). 
These proposals form a solid technical base upon which to move ahead with the process of trade 
convergence in South America. The decision to actually do so now lies in the political realm.  
 
Table IV.1 
CONVERGENCE PROPOSALS BY SECRETARIATS OF INTEGRATION SCHEMES AND 
COMPLEMENTARY ISSUES PROPOSED BY ECLAC 
Areas Secretariats of the Andean Community, 
MERCOSUR and LAIA 
Complementary proposals by ECLAC 
Tariffs Speed up convergence towards tariff elimination, especially in 
favour of the smaller and relatively less developed countries. 
The objective proposed by the Secretariats is 
very important. 
Rules of origin Harmonize rules; strengthen the legal basis; certificates of origin; 
reduce time limits for verification and control. 
Rapid progress could be made without complex 





WTO agreements and LAIA resolution 226 of 5 March 1997 
provide a common base. 
Further progress with customs procedures is 
needed. In particular, a greater effort should 
be made to automate, simplify and facilitate 
trade without reducing oversight. 
Trade remedies Maintain national provisions in accordance with WTO rules 
(antidumping and subsidies). 
Eliminate antidumping measures for 
originating products in intra-zone trade. 
Maintain countervailing duties in cases where 
subsidies are applied. 
Safeguard 
measures 
Two safeguard mechanisms: a mechanism consisting of a general 
safeguard (trade safeguard) and another one that would be applicable 
to a small group of agricultural products and would be triggered by 
volume and price. 
Eliminate safeguards in intra-community trade 
and maintain the mechanism during transition 
period. With respect to third parties, maintain 
WTO individual mechanisms. 
Non–tariff 
measures 
Begin negotiations among members with a view to gradually 
eliminating non-tariff measures. In terms of offers, these negotiations 
would entail setting a deadline for the elimination of all measures, 
including a timeline for elimination of NTMs. 
Strengthen non-tariff-measure disciplines, 
e.g., by reference to the corresponding WTO 
provisions, and the prohibition of non-tariff 
measures along with the relevant explanations, 
emphasizing the impact of the measures and 
their possible justification in the context of the 
agreed rules. They could eventually be 
eliminated through dispute settlement 
procedures. 
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Table IV.1 (concluded) 
Areas Secretariats of the Andean Community, 
MERCOSUR and LAIA 
Complementary proposals by ECLAC 
Technical 
barriers to trade 
Move forward on substantive issues in the framework of this agreement, 
in particular, in areas relating to harmonization of technical rules and 
regulations; sign agreements on mutual recognition of national 
conformity assessment procedures, as well as other initiatives relating 
to confidence building and technical assistance. 
It does not seem advisable to proceed with 
harmonization of technical rules and 
regulations. Decisive action should be taken 
on the issues of equivalency and mutual 
recognition, as well as on trade facilitation 
measures in connection with accreditation 




(i) promote harmonized rules for the development of common sanitary 
and phytosanitary requirements for specific products; 
(ii) promote free movement of agricultural products through recognition 
of sanitary and phytosanitary certificates; 
(iii) develop harmonized mechanisms and procedures for inspection 
tasks and quarantine control; 
(iv) promote training activities for personnel specializing in the 
application and development of the principles embodied in the SPS 
Agreement; and 
(v) promote the strengthening of agricultural health institutions. 
Effectively implement in the region the 
operating criteria of “pest —or disease— 
free zones”, improvements in management 
and decision–making, risk assessment and 
cooperation with responsible institutions. 
Trade in services There is a suitable framework for moving forward at the regional level 
in the area of services, given the common framework provided by the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the experience  
of the Andean Community and MERCOSUR. Future negotiations 
should: (i) have a greater scope and depth than commitments made by 
South American countries in the WTO; (ii) consider substantial 
coverage of sectors and supply chains so the agreement can benefit 
from the exception in the Most Favoured Nation clause of GATS, and 
(iii) develop with transparency and equity, assuming the commitment 
not to introduce new obstacles or restrictions to trade in services.  
The key is to undertake, within a short 
period of time, to eliminate restrictions that 
are incompatible with the guiding 
principles of trade in services. This means 
doing away with the current focus on 
holding to the status quo and establishing 
commitments based on a positive list. 
Investment There are no concrete negotiation proposals. Nonetheless, negotiations 
should begin with: (i) the creation of a common legal structure designed 
to promote and protect investment in the region; and (ii) cooperation 
initiatives among national investment promotion agencies, and 
eventually the creation of a strategy for promoting South America as a 
safe destination for investment.  
For now, convergence is hard to achieve 
because of the differences in approach and 




Given the diversity of rules and approaches in the region, consider 
common principles and procedures for the region, including procedures 
for monitoring, institutional cooperation and dispute settlement.  
It is important to first identify the 
objectives being pursued in this area. 
Competition 
policies 
Move forward with two options: (i) establish a mechanism for 
cooperation between the relevant national agencies (including those 
charged with consumer protection); and (ii) establish a regional legal 
framework, covering general areas that are applicable to all South 
American countries.  
Cooperation between responsible agencies 
seems to be the most feasible mechanism. 
Government 
procurement 
Agree on a common public procurement framework that includes 





Consider the creation of a regional framework for dispute settlement 
with at least three phases: direct negotiations among the disputing 
parties, intervention by the administrator of the agreement, and binding 
arbitration. An instrument of this kind is important for providing 
judicial security to future trade rules in the Union of South American 
Nations. 
This mechanism should be one option 
among others that are available, including 
in WTO. 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Andean Community, “Documentos 
elaborados por las secretarías generales de la Comunidad Andina, Mercosur y ALADI para el proceso de convergencia 
sudamericano” [online] http://www.comunidad_andina.org/csn/estudios.htm. 
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The 11 members of the Latin American Pacific Basin Initiative have also explored trade 
convergence initiatives since the forum’s creation in 2007.9 Specifically, during its Fifth Ministerial 
Meeting, held in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, in November 2009, members agreed to begin negotiations 
towards this end, starting with the issue of cumulation origin, and advancing in parallel on the topics of 
technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, customs procedures, services, dispute 
settlement, trade remedies, among others.10 The negotiations will be based on two modalities: (a) existing 
agreements among the countries of the Latin American Pacific Basin Initiative, and (b) a new agreement 
for the gradual convergence towards free trade between its members. The process is expected to be 
flexible, allowing each country to advance in both modalities. 
 
Until now, discussions about convergence within the Latin American Pacific Basin have not 
included the issue of tariff convergence or the creation of a free trade area among its 11 members. This 
reflects the fact that the matrix of preferential trade relations among its members is still incomplete (see 
table IV.2).11 Alternatively, negotiators have pursued convergence through cumulation of origin.12 This 
certainly results in technical complexity given the different rules of origin procedures that exist in the 
several trade agreements linking members of this initiative and the fact that some members still lack a 
preferential trade agreement with other members of the group. Despite this, cumulation of origin could 
provide a way to achieve greater integration of the Latin American Pacific Basin Initiative economies by 
expanding the range of suppliers that producers and exporters in each member country would have access 
to while maintaining preferential access.  
 
As mentioned above, following the recent Ministerial Meeting in Puerto Vallarta, efforts —in 
addition to starting negotiations on trade convergence— aim to define the most appropriate legal 
foundation for implementing future agreements. The next Ministerial Meeting, to be held in Peru during 
the first half of 2010, should shed light on this issue.  
 
Despite any advances during the upcoming negotiations of the Latin American Pacific Basin 
countries, the larger objective of Latin American convergence, which involves building bridges between 
the Pacific- and the Atlantic-based initiatives, should not be forgotten. Only then will countries be able to 
maximize the benefits of convergence, in terms of broader markets and greater production chain 
integration, and make Latin America and the Caribbean more attractive for potential trading partners in 
other regions (particularly in Asia). As a result, the ongoing process in the Pacific Basin should be 
understood as a step along the way to that goal, not as an end in itself.  
 
                                                     
9
  Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, México, Nicaragua, Panama and Peru. 
10
  See text of the Declaration of Puerto Vallarta [online] http://www.arcodelpacifico.org/pdf/Declaracion_Puerto_ 
Vallarta.pdf. 
11
  The table overestimates the degree of free trade among the members of the Latin American Pacific Basin 
Initiative since it does not distinguish among the different types of agreements currently in effect. While some of 
these agreements cover nearly all trade between the countries, others are much more limited in the number of 
products covered and the degree of tariff reduction.  
12
  This consists of allowing inputs from any of the 11 members of the Latin American Pacific Basin Initiative used 




MEMBERS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN PACIFIC BASIN INITIATIVE: NETWORK OF 
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, JANUARY 2010 
 Colombia Costa Rica Chile Ecuador
El 
Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru
Colombia X           
Costa 
Rica  X          
Chile   X         
Ecuador    X        
El 
Salvador     X       
Guatemala      X      
Honduras       X     
Mexico        X    
Nicaragua         X   
Panama          X  
Peru           X 
 
 Being implemented  Signed Under negotiation 






V. PROPOSALS FOR FOSTERING REGIONAL COOPERATION 
 
 
Today regional cooperation is more important than progress in trade liberalization. Thus, although 
it is important to make progress on freeing up intraregional trade, the proposals made here reflect a 
greater emphasis on other aspects of regional cooperation. Differing views coexist within the region today 
as to the role of international trade and modalities of integration into the global economy. The challenge is 
therefore to build integration on the basis of these differing views. Discrepancies on market access issues 
should not prevent progress on other matters that may be more urgent for dealing with competitiveness 
challenges in the region.13 In any case, many of the proposals presented below relate to trade facilitation 
and financing, which are of interest to all the countries of the region and do not give rise to the same 
disagreements as trade liberalization. 
 
 To summarize, the proposals made here focus on eight areas: infrastructure, aid for trade, 
innovation, reduction of asymmetries, social cohesion, closer ties with Asia-Pacific, reform of the 
international financial system and climate change.14 The approach adopted is based on the following three 
premises: 
 
• A regional approach to internationalization, on the assumption that regional cooperation is more 
effective than isolated efforts by each country to lay the foundations for international 
competitiveness linked to sustainable economic development and social cohesion and inclusion. 
 
• Bottom-up integration, which will become more effective as cooperation grows between the 
various sectors of the economy, local regions and civil society. This is the case, for example, 
of areas that share a border or of businesses and communities that have the complementarities 
or affinities to form clusters. 
 
• Regional cooperation at work, reflected in an approach based on action, coordination and 
results rather than on “foundational” goals. 
 
 In short, rather than expending efforts and resources on sweeping reforms which are scarcely 
viable in the short term, the idea is to adapt to existing resources and institutions, establish which 
measures and initiatives garner the greatest consensus, and foster the convergence of public and private 
stakeholders around practical proposals of mutual interest. Last but not least, the regional cooperation 
agenda is facing a crucial test: putting in place a regional cooperation plan with Haiti (see box V.1). 
 
                                                     
13
  Trade issues are not necessarily any more complex than, for example, cooperation on energy. On the contrary, 
experience shows that the latter area involves larger numbers of public and private entities and greater regulatory 
complexities, and that taxation factors and exchange-rate risks are more significant than in the case of trade 
issues. In any case, these are issues that need to be approached from the viewpoint of regional integration if the 
emphasis is to be on a future agenda. 
14
  The proposals on infrastructure, aid for trade, innovation and social cohesion are the result of joint efforts over a 





INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL COOPERATION FOR HAITI 
 
Haiti has been going through one of the most difficult periods in its history since the earthquake that struck on 12 
January 2010. This is estimated to have cost the lives of some 200,000 people so far, while over 200,000 have been 
left injured and 3 million have lost their homes. The experience acquired by ECLAC in supporting reconstruction 
after previous disasters suggests that this one will be considerably more expensive for Haiti than the 2008 
hurricanes, which themselves cost 15% of GDP. Over 600 international organizations and institutions are currently 
assisting and coordinating their efforts so that Haiti can come through this dramatic situation. 
 The United Nations is urgently seeking to improve the way assistance is organized in Haiti by coordinating 
the political, aid and military efforts. This will require the Haitian Government to take over leadership of the 
operations before long, with strong support from the international community. The recent Montreal conference, 
involving the United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS), the European Union and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), together with representatives of 20 countries, agreed to set up an international 
agency to assist development in Haiti by meeting needs identified by the Haitian Government, coordinating aid and 
laying out a recovery plan. The reconstruction of Haiti is an undertaking that will need to be sustained over the long 
term, most likely throughout the current decade. 
 For the moment, the urgent need is to continue to attend to the basic health, food, and shelter needs of the 
population. The next step will be a proper assessment of the damage, after which a plan can be drawn up to rebuild 
infrastructure, create jobs and develop the economy. It will be necessary to restore essential services and institutions, 
re-establish and enhance the country’s production capacity and support the affected population with housing, health, 
education and productive employment programmes. 
 Haiti was receiving increasingly substantial net flows of aid before this catastrophe, and some progress 
towards the Millennium Development Goals, such as the reduction of mortality rates, was being made as a result, 
while in other cases, such as the prevalence of disease, progress was clearly inadequate. In any event, the disaster 
will set back progress towards each of these goals. 
 The challenge following the Haiti earthquake, in the medium and long terms, is development, where social, 
physical and institutional reconstruction are key ingredients.  
 This will require a long-term project that needs to transcend and sustain the commitment and determination 
of the different nations involved once the initial humanitarian work is over, focusing on essential issues such as 
extending and enhancing trade integration, encouraging investment for more and better jobs, fostering agricultural 
competitiveness, generating specific guidelines for education and creating a secure environment towards a path to 
sustainable long-term development. 
 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from the United 
Nation News Centre and remarks of the Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to the General Assembly on Haiti, 22 January 







A. INTRAREGIONAL COOPERATION 
 
 
1. Protecting and promoting infrastructure investment 
 
 
Infrastructure is critical for economic growth, productivity and balanced territorial development, and 
expanding it helps to reduce regional and local inequalities. The endowment of trade-related infrastructure 
is key to export development. To a great extent, infrastructure advances or lags determine transport costs, 
whose effects on trade equal —and sometimes exceed— the cost of tariffs or exchange-rate fluctuations. 
The available estimates show that trade flows have an elasticity of over 2 with respect to transport costs; 
in other words, a 10% increase in transport costs may lead to a 20% fall in trade volumes (Martínez and 
Suárez, 2005). 
 
 Latin America and the Caribbean suffers from a severe infrastructure deficit (see figure V.1). As 
the region emerges from the crisis, it is vital that infrastructure investment is not allowed to fall, as 
occurred during the external-debt crisis. That was the cause of much of the lost productivity and the 
competitiveness lags that the region still suffers in comparison with other developing regions.15. For 
example, while the emerging Asian economies have expended considerable resources on infrastructure 
investments since the 1980s, in Latin America that spending has fallen from 6% of GDP in the early 
1980s to a little over 2% in the early 2000s (see figure V.2). If infrastructure spending is once again 
allowed to suffer, this will weaken the region’s ability to bounce back when the world economy recovers, 
and its lag in competitiveness will worsen.  
 
 While countries and subregions in Latin America and the Caribbean show differing levels of 
development in terms of transport infrastructure, they also share a number of common challenges. Road 
and rail infrastructure is old and not properly maintained. The main road corridors lack capacity and there 
is a shortage of competitive rail services for freight transport. International transport networks suffer from 
operational restrictions, deficient interconnections and technical asymmetries between modalities, 
countries or both. Compliance with Government regulations is not properly enforced and standards differ 
between countries and between jurisdictions within countries. There are also failings in planning, public 
policy design and the allocation of roles to the public, private and international sectors. Regulatory 
frameworks are insufficient, and contracts are weak and insecure (Sánchez and Wilmsmeier, 2005). 
 
 Cross-border development axes, including bioceanic corridors, not only help to increase 
competitiveness and improve transport times and costs for extraregional trade; they also open up new 
production and urban planning opportunities, improving the balance at the geographical (between coastal 
areas and uplands) and social levels, and raising living standards for poor and backward communities, 
which tend to be located in the interior of the subregions (Maira, 2008). To this end, investments in these 
axes must address not only physical infrastructure requirements but also the traditional problems of 
border-crossing and transport regulation and facilitation.  
 
 
                                                     
15
  Calderón and Servén (2003) estimate that GDP growth rates in the South American countries would be higher by 
between 2.6 percentage points (Uruguay) and 5.8 percentage points (Plurinational State of Bolivia) if the region 




INFRASTRUCTURE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES AND REGIONS: ROAD DENSITY 
AND PERCENTAGE OF PAVED ROADS a 


















Source:  R. Sánchez and G. Wilmsmeier, “Provisión de infraestructura de transporte en América Latina: experiencia reciente y 
problemas observados”, Recursos naturales e infraestructura series, No. 94 (LC/L.2360-P), Santiago, Chile, Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2005. 
a  Simple indices of road availability are used as a proxy for the relative scarcity of infrastructure and logistics. 
 
Figure V.2 
LATIN AMERICA (6 COUNTRIES a): INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT, 1980-2006 


















Source:  C. Calderón and L. Servén, “Infraestructuras y desarrollo en América Latina: avances y retos”, document presented at 
the seminar Infrastructure 2020, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), November 2008. 
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 Some of the region’s countries have developed public-private partnership mechanisms that 
leverage resources for high-cost infrastructure works, freeing up public funds for smaller projects such as 
rural and approach roads, small fishing harbours and other ventures that have a direct impact on the living 
standards of the most disadvantaged areas and social groups. Such projects show both achievements and 
weaknesses, and their dissemination could encourage binational initiatives that could take advantage of 
good practices. 
 
Regional cooperation could help to narrow the “infrastructure gap” in the Latin American and 
Caribbean region. In this regard, the following measures are proposed: 
 
• Agree upon an indicative regional or subregional target for infrastructure investment, which 
raises the sum invested and effectively enhances the provision and quality of national and 
subregional infrastructure services. Investment and financing mechanisms must be reviewed 
in order to ensure greater efficiency. Based on international experience, an ambitious target 
but one that is essential for closing this gap might be on the order of 5% of GDP, taking into 
account the specificities of each subregion or country. Involve multilateral and regional 
finance bodies in the attainment of this target, developing the necessary programmes and 
projects through dialogue with the countries. 
 
• Create regional or subregional infrastructure funds involving public resources and regional 
financial institutions and development banks. 
 
• Engage the Tripartite Committee (IDB, OAS and ECLAC), together with the Andean 
Development Corporation (CAF), in providing advice to Governments for selecting the 
subregional projects that are most viable technically and financially and those which 
maximize synergies for the development of border areas. 
 
• Strengthen capital markets and their regulation so that capital and pension funds can play a 
greater role as sources of infrastructure financing. Complement national or regional efforts by 
mobilizing greater volumes of resources from private capital, sovereign funds and 
transnational corporations. 
 
• National authorities should improve their own capacities in the following ways: 
 
– Move forward towards national and regional infrastructure, transport and logistics 
strategies which are clear, shared, integrated and sustained over time. This will entail 
unifying visions at the level of government as well as among business and social sectors, 
and improving coordination at the regional level (see box V.2). 
 
– Review policies relating to the regulation of infrastructure services, to ensure that, in 
addition to encouraging private sector involvement, improvements in this area are 
effectively passed on to society and become channels for enhancing efficiency, 





INTEGRATED POLICIES FOR INFRASTRUCTURE, TRANSPORT AND LOGISTICS 
 
Public policies relating to infrastructure and transport have traditionally been handled separately in Latin America 
and the Caribbean and implemented on a unimodal basis. This has hindered the efficient operation and provision of 
infrastructure services. Another concern is that government policies do not include logistics in transport 
infrastructure and services planning or treat it as a strategic tool for competitiveness. 
 In globalized economies, productivity and competitiveness depend on numerous interrelated and 
interdependent variables. Policies to enhance them thus need to be similarly complex. In view of this, key 
components of competitiveness such as infrastructure, transport and logistics need to be examined as part of a 
system and not in isolation. The internal links between each of the groups of policy measures mean that programme 
synergies and scale will yield greater benefits than if these components were dealt with separately. 
 Increasing infrastructure investment means bringing in new forms of financing to supplement traditional 
ones, which in turn means better regulation. To strengthen the link between infrastructure and transport services 
planning, it is essential to improve inter-agency cooperation and public-sector efficiency and to create better links 
with the private sector by way of public-private partnerships. 
 Although a variety of national peculiarities need to be considered, the analysis of subnational, national and 
regional situations undertaken by ECLAC has revealed a number of common elements or best practices in the move 
towards an integrated infrastructure, transport and logistics policy. The main conclusions regarding the strategic, 
political/organizational and regulatory aspects are grouped below. 
 
Strategic considerations 
 • National policies for the development of infrastructure, transport and logistics need to be 
comprehensive from the start and not just the sum of sectoral development plans. Accordingly, 
national plans must take precedence over any sectoral planning. 
 • This integrated approach combines policies dealing with productivity and competitiveness, external 
trade and trade facilitation, infrastructure and multimodal transport (road, rail, river, sea and air, and 
the ports, airports, border crossings, logistics platforms, etc. that connect them), information and 
communication technologies, research and development and so forth. 
 • Policy planning, design and implementation should turn not on the mode of transport but on freight 
services, always with a view to ensuring the productivity and competitiveness of the goods or services 
the country produces and/or trades both in the home market and internationally. 
 • Decisions about planning horizons are critical and must take into account the dynamic of trade and 
international economic relations. It is essential to set and enforce deadlines. 
 
Political and organizational considerations 
 • Establish a lead agency that is the visible face of the policy development, implementation and 
oversight effort and guides the process. 
 • Strengthen intersectoral dialogue and analysis, favouring the creation of public-private partnerships. 
 • Secure political backing at the highest level of government and from other State authorities so that the 
policy is conceived as a State policy transcending the political cycle. 
 
Regulatory considerations 
 • Establish a legal reference framework that is clear, consistent and condensed into a single body of 
regulations to facilitate implementation (all-inclusive policy), reflect a consensus vision of the State 
and help maintain a model that is sustainable over time. 
 
Source:  T. Cipoletta, S. Pérez and R. Sánchez, “Políticas integradas de infraestructura, transporte y logística: experiencias 




– Strengthen national public investment systems, improving the quality of proposed 
projects and real possibilities of external financing. 
 
– Support the development of benchmarking systems for the main areas of infrastructure 
projects, facilitating project comparability and avoiding potential overpricing in bidding 
processes. 
 
• Organize workshops to share experiences on public-private partnerships for infrastructure 
projects, in order to draw lessons from successful outcomes or from failures both within and 
outside the region. 
 
• Strengthen support for the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South 
America (IIRSA), for the Meso-America Project and CARICOM by means of the following 
measures: 
 
– Continuously monitor potential bottlenecks that could obstruct the progress of priority 
projects already identified, owing to financing problems. Then create plurinational 
programmes incorporating solidarity-based support from several countries and financial 
institutions in the region, in order to expedite the launching of those projects. 
 
– Organize open-ended meetings to provide information on the activities conducted and 
under way to parliaments, business organizations and civil society. 
 
– Organize working groups to facilitate convergence between regulation and oversight 
systems for land-based and multimodal transport. 
 
• Modernize external trade logistics by means of the following measures: 
 
– Promote the use of modern transport and distribution methods by export SMEs. 
 
– Set up smart transport systems in ports and airports, on roads and railways and at 
distribution centres. 
 
– Create automated systems for all customs formalities and procedures. 
 






2. Promoting intraregional trade 
 
A number of experts have proposed the creation of a cooperation programme to promote intraregional 
trade, in which regionalized financing is combined with a flexible governance structure that brings 
together and coordinates countries and multilateral and regional bodies, including the private sector.16 The 
idea is not to establish new institutions, but to generate mechanisms for coordination among existing ones 
in order to make the most of their respective advantages and help to mobilize financial resources. 
 
 It is suggested that such a programme might include strengthening the different mechanisms 
of multilateral and regional organizations with contributions from donors, associated agencies and 
other international and private sector entities.17 Some of the activities such a fund could support are 
described below. 
 
(a) Short-term financing of intraregional trade 
 
 A central issue that arose during the recent financial crisis is dealing with liquidity constraints in 
external trade transactions. Financing is crucial to facilitate international trade, especially at the level of 
SMEs, be they exporters or importers. Following the outbreak of the crisis the cost of credit rose sixfold 
in just a few months. This caused considerable adversity, given that some 90% of world trade is financed 
by short-term loans. In the course of 2009, the situation returned to normal and the region’s risk levels 
have fallen, in some countries even to below pre-crisis levels. 
 
 Although credit access for trade operations may have returned to normal, the recent crisis 
demonstrated that existing hedging mechanisms, which, under normal circumstances, may be sufficient, 
prove inadequate for dealing with periods of uncertainty such as the current period. Moreover, SMEs in 
several countries of the region almost invariably experience difficulties in accessing loans, especially 
medium-term loans, for their business operations. Finance institutions should take steps to inform 
businesses about the characteristics of their instruments and make them aware of how risk is assessed and 
trade financing data collected. Much would be gained from expanded regional collaboration in this area 
among private banks, public bodies, international financial institutions and export credit agencies. 
 
 In this regard, a number of countries are looking at the possibility of setting up regional or 
subregional mechanisms to allow a higher proportion of intraregional trade to be conducted in local 
currency (see box V.3). 
 
                                                     
16 
 See Stiglitz and Carlton (2006). 
17
  There are several multilateral and regional agencies that support trade and competitiveness. These include the 
World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, the 
Bank of the South, the Andean Development Corporation and the Financial Fund for the Development of the 





FACILITATING INTRAREGIONAL TRADE BY REDUCING THE USE OF FOREIGN CURRENCY 
 
Some of the countries of the region have been seeking mechanisms to reduce the need for foreign exchange in 
intraregional trade. The only regional mechanism that promotes the use of local currencies is the Agreement on Reciprocal 
Payments and Credit, created in 1982 by the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). Under this Agreement, the 
central banks of 12 countriesa process and clear on a quarterly basis payments on mutual bilateral trade in goods and some 
services. Brokers participate voluntarily in transactions, which are conducted in local currency. At the end of the 
consolidation period the participating central banks calculate their net bilateral balances, which are expressed and settled 
in dollars. 
 The Agreement was widely used in the 1980s —accounting for nearly 90% of intraregional trade in 1989, owing 
to the widespread liquidity squeeze in dollars in the region at that time. During the 1990s, use of the system gradually 
became less prevalent and by 2003 it had practically fallen into disuse. Since then, it has made a slight comeback. Today 
the Agreement is used for approximately 10% of intraregional trade —primarily that of the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, all of whose trade must be channelled through it owing to foreign-exchange controls, and to a small extent that 
of Brazil (the operations of the National Bank for Economic and Social Development, or BNDES) and Colombia. Various 
factors explain the limited use of the Agreement today, particularly the high credit risk incurred by central banks (which 
guarantee payments), the high interest rates charged for debits in Agreement-based accounts compared with other 
international rates and the growing ease of conducting financial transactions through private banking networks. 
 The scarcity of foreign currency and tight trade financing restrictions that prevailed during the recent crisis 
revived interest in creating a mechanism to facilitate intraregional trade through the use of local currencies. Various 
proposals have been put forth, such as updating or complementing the arrangement provided for under the Agreement on 
Reciprocal Payments and Credit, or replacing it with a regional-trade clearing house that would overcome the limitations 
of the Agreement and would follow the best practices recommended by the Bank for International Settlements. Such an 
arrangement could also adopt various features of the Brazil-Argentina Local Currency System, which began to operate 
experimentally for bilateral trade in October 2008. 
 A new clearing house would have to operate efficiently and in a flexible manner if it is to compete with other 
forms of payment. For example, a company and its counterpart abroad would have to choose the currency in which they 
would conduct the trading operation and determine which party would absorb the exchange-rate risk. Commodity 
exporters might find it best to draw up their invoices in a reserve currency such as the dollar. On the other hand, small 
exporters of non-primary goods might find it preferable to prepare theirs in the currency of the import market (especially if 
it is a large one) and assume the exchange risk in order to consolidate their market access. Medium-sized exporters with a 
high domestic-cost component may prefer to prepare their invoices in their own currency. The daily exchange rates of 
local currencies would be calculated in relation to a widely traded currency (the euro or dollar). A regional financial entity 
could serve as a clearing house. A well-designed mechanism could reduce the use of foreign currency in intraregional 
trade by 70%. The adoption of a system based completely on local currency is not considered advisable, because countries 
running a surplus would build up reserves in the currency of those running a deficit, thereby paying them seigniorage. 
Moreover, liquid spot markets or futures markets do not exist for all the currencies that might be expected to participate. 
 This system offers several advantages. First, if a crisis becomes prolonged, the countries of the region could 
continue to trade among themselves, using mainly their own currencies —provided the crisis does not trigger great volatility 
in the price of national currencies. Second, the mechanism would be of particular benefit to microenterprises and SMEs, 
which have difficulties accessing futures markets and, in addition, conduct most of their trade operations within region. 
 In the Central American integration process, the clearing house mechanism played a significant part up to the 
early 1990s. With the introduction of structural reforms and the greater inflow of foreign currency, the mechanism was 
discontinued. Today, it is once again being considered as an instrument for boosting intraregional trade. In the same 
connection, the countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA) are advocating the 
establishment of the Unified System for Regional Compensation (SUCRE) with a view to its entry into force in the first 
half of 2010 as a means of relieving the shortage of foreign exchange in economies that tend to run a current-account 
deficit. If this form of cooperation, based on the SUCRE, is successful, it could stimulate trade among member countries at 
a time when external demand is weak. 
 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
a
  Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, 




(b) Trade facilitation as a means of supporting intraregional trade 
 
 Trade facilitation must be understood not just as a reduction in the number of bureaucratic 
formalities associated with external trade, or in the time necessary for completing them but also as an 
integrated approach that seeks to streamline trade transactions, including the availability of transport and 
ICT infrastructure. Thus, trade facilitation goes beyond bureaucratic red tape and relates to the 
development of a logistical system for international trade which includes, but is not restricted to, export 
and import procedures. As such, it plays an essential part in developing a country’s international 
competitiveness. Nevertheless, the Latin America and Caribbean region presents major lags in this area 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, REPUBLIC OF KOREA, ORGANISATION FOR 
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT AND SINGAPORE: SELECTED 
INDICATORS OF COST AND TIME INVOLVED IN FOREIGN TRADE 
 
 (a) Time for export and import (b) Import and export costs 















Source: World Bank, Doing Business 2010. 
a
  Others: includes Chile and Panama. 
 
 
The existence of an integrated logistical system can make it easier to attract FDI and can 
contribute to the modernization and gradual globalization of SMEs. Clearly, this challenge means not 
only strengthening coordination among the Government agencies involved, but also relying on various 
public-private partnership arrangements that enhance communication between stakeholders, sharing of 
information, dialogue on administrative reforms and the commitment of business organizations to 
innovation and the competitiveness.  
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COOPERATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA ON TRADE FACILITATION 
 
The Meso-America Project (formerly the Puebla-Panama Plan) has worked closely with the Central American 
Economic Integration Secretariat (SIECA) to support the Meso-American Procedure for International Goods Traffic 
(TIM). This has involved installing computer systems and introducing standardized procedures at border control 
posts to optimize and improve customs and quarantine procedures and formalities in international goods traffic 
operations, thereby making border crossings easier for such operations, reducing transport costs and increasing 
competitiveness. The pilot trials of TIM at the El Amatillo border crossing (El Salvador-Honduras), which began in 
July 2008, and its implementation at the Pedro de Alvarado-La Hachadura crossing (Guatemala-El Salvador), cut 
average crossing times from over an hour to less than eight minutes. The design of the procedure and system and the 
implementation of the first phase of the project were financed with non-reimbursable technical cooperation of US$ 2 
million from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Financial support was also provided by the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI). The project was implemented by SIECA (Meso-America 
Project, 2009). 
 
The Meso-American Procedure for International Goods Traffic (TIM): concrete results 
 1. Finalization of the uniform standard procedure for international goods traffic operations, from the 
southern border of Mexico to Panama. 
 2. Determination of the data to be shared electronically between customs, migration and quarantine 
authorities in eight countries of Meso-America. 
 3. Computerized procedure for international goods traffic. 
 4. Interconnection and functionality of the computer systems managing goods transit operations between 
Honduras and El Salvador. 
 5. Operational testing in progress since July 2008 under a pilot plan at the border posts of La Hachadura 
(Guatemala-El Salvador), El Amantillo ( El Salvador-Honduras) and Guasaule (Honduras-Nicaragua). 
 6. Improvements to telematic and computer infrastructure in customs and quarantine administrations 
(head offices and border establishments). 
 7. Single unified border traffic control. 
 8. Cutting-edge tools to facilitate risk analysis at customs. 
 9. Unification of data and declarations in a single electronic declaration. 
 10. Reduction of over 80% in time spent on border operations. 
 11. Reduction of operating costs. 
 12. Substantial improvement in transparency and predictability. 
 
Source: Meso-America Project, Informe ejecutivo 2008-2009, Meso-America Project Executive Commission, 2009. 
 
 
 Effective progress in coordinating all the institutions involved in international trade operations in 
each country is possible only when the political commitment exists among authorities at the highest level. 
A permanent institutional framework is required, which aims to achieve an optimum balance between 
regulation and efficiency. This applies equally well at the subregional and regional levels. At these levels, 
it is indispensable to set up institutions for harmonizing procedures, especially to ensure interoperability 
and standardization of procedures. An attempt must also be made to speed up legal agreements that 
recognize modern business instruments (electronic billing, electronic certificates of origin, and inter-
agency single windows, among others). This means that the remaining steps to be taken to achieve this 
convergence of procedures also involve the judicial sector and parliaments.  
 
In this regard, projects such as the Meso-American Procedure for International Goods Traffic (see 
box V.4), the Digital Certificates of Origin being pursued by the Latin American Integration Association 
(LAIA), the implementation of inter-agency single windows in Colombia and Brazil and the remarkable 
experiences of Colombia, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Peru prove that ICT can 
be a valuable instrument for raising regional competitiveness. Developments relating to customs 
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procedures include the signing of the Central American Uniform Customs Code (CAUCA), an essential 
component of the Central American Customs Union.  
 
The countries of the region have been active participants in the negotiations on trade facilitation18 
taking place as part of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization and which, according to various 
studies, could have a more significant impact on global trade flows than the tariff results of the Round itself.19 
Given the uncertain prospects for concluding the Round, the countries of the region should consider 
implementing nationally or regionally the proposals they have formulated at the multilateral level, irrespective 
of the advances achieved in Geneva. Moreover, agreements can be concluded at the regional level that go 
beyond the scope of the WTO negotiations. Emphasis should be placed on initiatives to improve transport and 
logistics, especially those recommended for landlocked countries in the Almaty Programme of Action. 
 
 Table V.1 shows a number of proposals for action in the area of trade facilitation which could have 
a positive impact on regional integration, the streamlining of transport flows and international trade costs. 
As regards facilitating the free movement of people, the cooperation initiatives under way in Central 
America are an interesting development (see box V.5). 
 
Table V.1 
OPPORTUNITIES IN TRADE FACILITATION AND TRANSPORT 
Area Suggestions for the short term 
E-commerce – Seek common ground (such as standards) to enable interconnection among regional actors
– Eliminate red tape in customs 
– Form business partnerships to enhance international competitiveness 
– Strengthen logistical and transport systems 
– Recognize electronic signatures  
Single window – Designate a central coordination entity at the national level and a regional centre for 
system recognition and interconnection 
– Promote coordination and consistency among national systems to facilitate 
interconnection 
– Use universally accepted systems for paperless trade 
Customs procedures – Adopt compatible administrative systems to enable interconnection and reduce the time 
and costs of procedures 
– Disseminate such systems in the private sector, particularly among SMEs 
– Promote regional coordination to expedite procedures 
– Use pre-shipment inspections and other mechanisms to cut waiting times at loading and 
unloading points 




– Accelerate regional integration projects, especially those involving infrastructure and 
interconnections that will benefit landlocked countries 
– Coordinate with the private sector to identify bottlenecks in a timely manner and 
propose joint projects  
– Foster intermodal and complementary means of transport 
                                                     
18
  The current negotiations on trade facilitation within WTO are limited to three articles of GATT 1994, namely, 
article V on Freedom of Transit, article VIII on Fees and Formalities Connected with Importation and 
Exportation, and article X on the Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations. In other words, this is a 
subset of the overall trade facilitation agenda. 
19
  See, for example, Adler and others (2009).  
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Table V.1 (concluded) 




– Disseminate models for electronic documents (eDocs) available from the United 
Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic Business (CEFACT)  
– Disseminate and adopt international regulations governing maritime transport, handling 
of dangerous cargo and other international documents for facilitating international 
transport 
– Implement e-government systems, especially international standards and classifications, 
to permit paperless trade 
Phytosanitary 
standards 
– Ensure consistency with international standards and cooperation and training for the 
fulfilment of health and safety requirements 
– Put in place sampling and prevention techniques aimed at avoidance or early detection 
of risks in the distribution chain, thus forestalling large-scale health emergencies 
Interface between 
the public and 
private sectors 
– Set up centres to train SMEs in ICT use 
– Strengthen export financing mechanisms using elements of trade and e-governance to 
deal with any reduction in the supply of private financing 




REGIONAL TOURISM COOPERATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
 
Tourism in the Central American isthmus has developed considerably in recent years, becoming a major source of 
currency earnings. At 8.2% a year, average growth in 2000-2006 easily exceeded the world average of 3.6% for the 
period (UNWTO, 2007). Indeed, from 2000 to 2006 tourism grew faster in the Central American isthmus than 
anywhere else in the world except North-East Asia (8.3%).  
 Regional cooperation has helped both to increase intraregional tourism and to regionalize tourism 
originating from countries outside the area. In the first case, the creation of a migration document within the C-4 
area of Central America (El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala y Nicaragua), allowing citizens of any of the partner 
countries to enter the others freely, has helped to increase the amount of travel between these countries. This facility 
has also been extended to Panama (Costa Rica allows visitors from Panama, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras 
to enter without a consular visa but requires one from Nicaraguan citizens). In addition to migration facilities, 
improved land communication links have boosted intraregional tourism. This is particularly evident in tourist travel 
between Guatemala and El Salvador, which accounts for the largest number of journeys within the region. 
 The countries of the subregion have also developed cooperation mechanisms to allow them to benefit 
jointly from tourism from elsewhere, especially Europe. As part of their common efforts to promote tourism, the 
countries of the Central American isthmus have created the Central America Tourism Agency (CATA), a public-
private body responsible for implementing the subregional strategy to attract European tourists. Nothing similar has 
as yet been created to attract tourists from the United States, the subregion’s main market, with each country 
continuing to design its own strategy. The Central American Council for Tourism (CCT) has developed another 
subregional strategy consisting in a number of investment projects, market studies and regulatory frameworks and 
the creation of a Central America brand (“Central America: so small… so big…”), while holding an annual fair 
called the Central America Travel Market and promoting tourism over the Internet, among other things. 
 CATA activities have included negotiations between European airlines and Central American Air 
Transport (TACA) to start direct flights between Europe and Central America; promoting the Central America brand 
referred to above and presenting the subregion as a multi-destination via the Internet and travel agencies; organizing 
and holding promotional fairs; and creating strategic alliances and cooperation arrangements with organizations such 
as TACA, the Spanish International Cooperation Agency for Development (AECID) and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China, among others. 
  
58
Box V.5 (concluded) 
 
 Different subregional projects have been developed under the auspices of CCT and the Central American 
Integration System (SICA), such as the Regional Tourism and Geography Information System (SIG) (the world 
heritage route), signposting projects for agreed tourist routes, programmes to improve tourism promotion in Central 
America, the Central America Tourism Satellite Account Project for the macroeconomic analysis of tourism in the 
subregion, a tourism services quality project, a network of rural inns in Central America, the preparation of an 
intraregional tourism promotion strategy, a Central America information CD, a project to strengthen tourism 
institutions (Central American chambers of tourism), the Central America Travel Market and training programmes 
(CCT, 2009). 
 The aim is to present the Central America region as a diverse area that can attract tourists to different 
destinations in the isthmus. This alliance can help to generate synergies and benefits that exceed the sum of each 
country’s individual efforts. Accordingly, the countries are making an effort to highlight their special characteristics. 
Costa Rica, for example, is pre-eminently an ecotourism destination, while Panama sees itself as a place for business 
and trade thanks to its financial centre and logistical developments around the Panama Canal, although it has 
developed very attractive seaside and beach resorts over the past few years. Guatemala is a very interesting 
destination for cultural tourism, with a long track record in this niche market. The geographical location of El 
Salvador makes it a good regional interconnection and meeting point (conventions, events, etc.) and the TACA 
airline hub is an important element in this regard. It has also benefited from the visits of the growing migrant 
population now living in the United States. Tourist activity in Honduras and Nicaragua is incipient, but their natural 
attractions could prove a strong draw. All these projects and initiatives have the potential to strengthen the tourism 
sector, which has already proved how important it is to the subregion, particularly where job creation is concerned, 
and they could be extended to Asian countries, where no significant efforts have as yet been made to attract tourists 
to Central America. 
 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), ECLAC subregional headquarters in Mexico. 
 
 
(c) Aid for trade 
 
 Although trade agreements have considerably improved its access to the principal markets, the 
region still faces major internal constraints which prevent it from taking greater advantage of its 
integration into the world economy. These constraints include lack of information on trade opportunities, 
excessive red tape for exporting or importing, a shortage of financing for SMEs and infrastructure 
problems. The aid-for-trade initiative introduced by WTO in 2005 aims to reduce these constraints. 
 
The region’s share of global aid-for-trade flows (measured as new commitments) rose from an 
average of 7.1% in the period between 2002 and 2005 to 8% in 2007, the last year for which comparable 
information for all regions is available. This figure is, however, far lower than the 42% for Asia and 37% 
for Africa in the same year (see figure V.4). Only two countries in the region —El Salvador and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia— ranked among the 20 leading recipients of aid for trade in 2007, with 
shares of 1.5% and 1%, respectively, of total new commitments (OECD/WTO, 2009). At the subregional 
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Source:  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World Trade Organization (WTO), Aid for 
Trade at a Glance 2009: Maintaining Momentum, 2009. 
 
 
The region’s relatively low share in total aid-for-trade flows is due to a number of factors, 
including its relatively high per capita income and smaller population compared with Africa and Asia. 
Moreover, the countries in the region have, generally speaking, greater access to private international 
capital markets and are able, to finance them through a significant portion of their trade-related 
infrastructure requirements. 
 
In the region, aid-for-trade commitments in 2007 were concentrated in two categories: building 
productive capacity (56%) and building economic infrastructure (41%) (see figure V.5). This 
appropriation differs from that observed worldwide, where the second category is dominant. As regards 
the distribution between the subregions, building infrastructure takes the larger share in Central America, 
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Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)/World Trade Organization (WTO), Aid for Trade 
at a Glance 2009b: Maintaining Momentum, 2009. 
Note:  The percentages beside the subregions denote their proportion of the region’s total aid-for-trade allocations.  
 
 
The foregoing demonstrates that there is room for the Latin American and Caribbean region to 
increase its share of aid for trade. The countries of the region should therefore make aid for trade a central 
component of their requests for international cooperation, defining priorities and outlining major projects 
that will enable them to obtain new resource flows in response to the principles of additionality, 
sustainability and effectiveness of aid. Particular, efforts should be aimed at attracting funds for projects, 
such as IIRSA and the Meso-America Project, which involve several countries and have a clear trade 
facilitation component.  
 
The fact that the situation and, consequently, the requirements of the different subregions of Latin 
America and the Caribbean are not the same must also be borne in mind. This is due to the differences 
between the regions in terms of their production and export patterns and other important variables, such 
as the institutional maturity of the integration schemes. The Caribbean subregion, for example, has shown 






























RECENT COOPERATION INITIATIVES WITHIN CARICOM 
 
Recently, members of CARICOM have stepped up their cooperation in several areas. In regional integration, the 
countries of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, except Montserrat, signed an agreement at the end of 
2009 to form an economic union, which is to be ratified by individual parliaments by June 2010. Also, a major step 
forward was made in the treatment of asymmetries, as the CARICOM Development Fund (CDF), headquartered in 
Bridgetown (Jamaica), started its operation in August 2009. By end-2009, its member States had contributed US$ 87 
million, while another US$ 130 million is expected from donors. 
On financial issues, CARICOM members signed the Liliendaal Declaration on the Financial Sector in 2009 
to contain the effects in the region of the global financial crisis and reform the financial sector in the subregion. The 
Declaration introduces new guidelines and regulatory standards for the sector and fosters regional collaboration. It 
also calls for increased transparency, early warning systems and stress tests. 
In fisheries, the Caribbean Regional Fisheries Mechanism (CRFM) is developing a Master Plan on 
Sustainable Use of Fisheries Resources for Coastal Community Development in the Caribbean. In 2009, it reviewed 
a baseline survey, draft plan and project activities. In energy, the Caribbean Renewable Energy Development 
Program (CREDP) has stepped up its activities with new funds from donors, and in-kind contributions from the 
Organization of American States and regional Governments. 
On social issues, the Caribbean Public Health Authority (CARPHA) formed a resource mobilization team 
and established its main campus in Trinidad and Tobago in 2009. Moreover, the CARICOM Implementing Agency 
for Crime and Security (IMPACS) will introduce a CARICOM Travel Card (CARIPASS), which will reduce travel 
restrictions for CARICOM residents at regional airports. Other security initiatives address the issue of violent crimes 
fuelled by the illicit trade in guns and ammunition and the impact of deportees in the Caribbean. Finally, in 2007 a 
Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CRIFF) was established, which has made payments to Dominica and 
Santa Lucia (2007), Turks and Caicos (2008) and Haiti. 
 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), subregional headquarters for the Caribbean. 
 
 
The attraction of increased aid-for-trade flows is all the more necessary following the sharp fall 
in other flows of external financing to the region in 2009 such as FDI, export revenues, migrants’ 
remittances and tourism earnings. Aid for trade in areas such as infrastructure development may not just 
boost the economies of the region in the short term, but also strengthen their capacity to stage a more 
robust recovery in the post-crisis period. 
 
 In stating their preferences, the countries of the Caribbean have underscored their need for 
support in the fields of competitiveness, infrastructure, export diversification and integration. In the case 
of Haiti, these requirements have clearly escalated dramatically and a substantial support programme 





THE CARIBBEAN: AID-FOR-TRADE PRIORITIES 
AFT commitments 
(Millions of United States 
dollars in 2007 prices)  Priority 1 Priority 2 Priority 3 
2002-2005 2007 
Antigua and Barbuda  Trade policy  Competitiveness Infrastructure 2.1 0.2 
Bahamas  Trade policy  Value chains Export diversification 0.0 0.0 
Barbados  Competitiveness Trade policy analysis Regional integration 0.4 15.2 
Belize  Trade facilitation Export diversification Regional integration 9.4 3.1 
Cuba a Changing production patterns Infrastructure Trade policy  8.8 8.3 
Dominica  Competitiveness Regional integration Trade policy  12.3 6.3 
Dominican Republic  Trade policy  Regional integration Competitiveness 42.2 33.4 
Grenada Export diversification Trade policy analysis Competitiveness  6.4 0.2 
Guyana  Infrastructure Competitiveness Export diversification 40.7 94.8 
Haiti a Infrastructure Changing production patterns Trade policy  81.6 54.5 
Jamaica  Infrastructure Competitiveness Export diversification 33.8 50.8 
Saint Kitts and Nevis b Competitiveness - - 1.4 0.0 
Saint Lucia  Costs of the 
adjustment Transport 
Competitiveness and 
export diversification  7.5 8.9 
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines  Competitiveness Infrastructure Regional integration 4.4 7.8 
Suriname  Trade policy  Regional integration Infrastructure 23.0 21.8 
Source:  World Trade Organization (WTO)/Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), “Self Assessment Replies”, 
Implementing Aid for Trade in Latin America and the Caribbean 2008-2009.  
a
  No information available.  
b
  Only indicated one priority. 
 
 
3. Strengthening the social aspect of integration 
 
Any proposal for regional cooperation must incorporate the social dimension in its agenda. This ageda 
includes aspects of social cohesion, multiculturalism and inclusion, which are part and parcel of the 
purpose and rationale of integration and of efforts to build regional competitiveness in a way that is 
compatible with social equity. In this regard, one of the merits of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples 
of our America (ALBA) has been to draw attention to the importance of addressing social issues in 






TREATMENT OF ASYMMETRIES IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION SCHEMES 
 
All the integration schemes in the region have, from their inception, included special provisions for relatively less 
developed countries (LDCs). In addition to the special and differential treatment (SDT), other measures for smaller 
economies have been introduced by means of instruments that further industrial promotion, investment and special 
financing for projects. However, because of the external debt crisis and, later, the Asian crisis, as well as the 
underdevelopment of institutional and physical infrastructure to address asymmetries, these measures were 
piecemeal and achieved few successes.  
Only in recent years has renewed concern arisen over asymmetries and the need to implement more 
effective regional measures to mitigate them, given the failure to narrow the gaps that existed when integration 
processes began. The experiences in the treatment of asymmetries in the main subregional schemes of Latin 
America and the Caribbean are reviewed briefly below. 
 
Andean Community 
 In 1999, the Andean Community implemented the Community Policy on Border Integration and 
Development and the Integrated Social Development Plan. The Community also decided to maintain the preferences 
for relatively less developed countries in terms of participation in regional project financing as well as trade and tariff 
rules on market access. Also of note is the support that the Secretary-General of the Andean Community has provided 
to Bolivia (to strengthen its export capacity) and to Ecuador (in evaluating its trade policies vis-à-vis WTO). 
 
Central American Common Market (CACM) 
 In 2003, the member States of the Central American Common Market commissioned the Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) to draft a regional social proposal for a cohesion fund, with the support of 
the Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration (SIECA). The proposal is in the drafting stage and still 
subject to regular revision. The aim of the fund is to help reduce the development disparities between the various 
subnational regions and contribute to making up the lag of the least advantaged. 
 The Meso-American Project is a cooperation and integration scheme made up of 10 nations (Belize, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua and Panama). 
This scheme was created in 2001 and acquired its structure and current functions in 2008. Its initiatives consist of 
projects in energy, telecommunications and transport and are designed to set up a physical and digital 
interconnection network between member States. This scheme also includes projects relating to trade facilitation, 
sustainable development and social affairs. 
 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
 The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (2001), which succeeded the 1973 charter agreement of CARICOM, 
addressed asymmetries through SDT, including the possibility of introducing import restrictions to protect the LDCs 
in the group. This treaty provides for the creation of a regional development fund to provide technical and financial 
assistance to disadvantaged countries, regions and sectors as the group moves towards deeper integration. This fund 
became operational in August 2009. In June 2009, it was decided that the first countries to benefit from this fund 
would be Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines. The countries have also agreed to create a regional development agency, although this 
has not yet come into force.  
 The issue of the treatment of asymmetries has also appeared prominently in the context of the economic 
association agreement between the member countries of the Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific 
States (CARIFORUM) and the European Union. 
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Box V.7 (concluded) 
 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) 
 Between 2003 and 2004, the MERCOSUR member countries agreed a series of measures designed to 
benefit the smaller economies. The most significant was the creation of the MERCOSUR Structural Convergence 
Fund (FOCEM), which became operational in 2007. The Fund’s objectives are as follows: (i) structural convergence 
of the less developed economies and regions; (ii) development of competitiveness by promoting and employment 
restructuring and the formation of production chains, among other production measures; (iii) social cohesion in 
human health, poverty reduction and unemployment; and (iv) strengthening of the institutional structure. 
 FOCEM was set up with US$ 100 million, of which Brazil provided 70%, Argentina 27%, Uruguay 2% 
and Paraguay 1%. Contributions are made annually, and FOCEM may receive funding from international 
organizations, institutions or third countries. The distribution of resources from the Fund is intended to favour 
projects in the relatively less developed countries of the group: 48% was allocated to Paraguay, 32% to Uruguay, 
and 10% each to Argentina and Brazil. The projects approved to date under FOCEM are geared for the most part 
towards building and upgrading infrastructure and towards areas such as housing and health. 
 
Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) 
 Support for the economically relatively less developed countries, a designation reserved for Ecuador, 
Paraguay and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, is a central component of the 1980 Montevideo Treaty, by which LAIA 
was established. The main tools at the disposal of LAIA for dealing with asymmetries are: (i) SDT which is reflected in 
the economic complementarity agreements as non-extensive lists of tariff reductions, a broader extension of 
concessions and a more flexible use of safeguards, thus seeking stronger protection for local production of the 
relatively less developed countries; and (ii) technical assistance, provided through an office specially established to 
study and coordinate measures for improving the relative position of the economically less developed countries.  
 
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) 
 The issue of asymmetries is covered in the constitutive agreement of this Union. Listed among its 
objectives is “the development of concrete and effective mechanisms to overcome asymmetries, thus achieving an 
equitable integration”. In this regard, a few initiatives are being implemented jointly with the Initiative for the 
Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA), since the UNASUR agenda does not yet address 
trade issues. Initial efforts are also being made to address some aspects of harmonization of public policies for social 
cohesion, through monitoring initiatives and dedicated social policy observatories. 
 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA) 
 The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA) includes fairly structured initiatives that 
derive from recognition of its principles for convergent and integrating development, especially from the social 
perspective and from the express recognition of the differences in the size and level of development of its members. 
The principal ALBA agreements relating to the treatment of asymmetries are enshrined in the People’s Trade 
Agreement, which encompasses multiple initiatives in the areas of health, education, food security and other 
cooperation areas.  
 Another noteworthy initiative is the Petrocaribe agreement, proposed by the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela in 2005 and signed to date by a total of 16 countries: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname. Petrocaribe seeks to reduce 
asymmetries by reducing the energy bill for net petroleum importers, coordinating energy policies, developing and 
using energy resources and exploring alternative and renewable sources of energy.  
 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Latin American Economic System on the 






 The countries of the region should take steps to strengthen the complementary dynamics among 
the social, economic and trade aspects of integration. Efforts should be redoubled to build subregional 
value chains in order to enable export to third markets and bring businesses from the least developed 
economies into those chains. This would help to reconcile growth with the quest for third markets and 
social cohesion, combining a more vibrant role on the external front with lower productivity gaps on the 
domestic front. Structural support to reduce asymmetries among countries would help to generate a 
competitive export supply in the relatively less developed ones.  
 
 Investment in infrastructure can play a decisive role in improving the living conditions of the 
poorest families, particularly in rural areas. Indeed, in rural areas, infrastructure is a crucial factor not only 
for increasing and diversifying production, and strengthening competitiveness but also for raising 
employment and income for poor households and reducing several of their systematic risks. These 
elements are particularly important in countries such as Mexico and those of Central America and the 
Andean area, where the incidence of rural poverty is severe and a high proportion of the population is still 
engaged in agriculture. Moreover, the most serious infrastructure problems occur in regions with a 
predominantly poor, rural population.20 Indeed, in these regions, and assuredly more so than in the 
middle-income countries of Latin America, rural areas have seen very limited public investment in recent 
years in highway and road construction and maintenance, and in small-scale irrigation and other 
infrastructure works. Private investment in storage and refrigeration facilities has also been very limited. 
As is well known, investment in roads and small-scale irrigation projects in rural areas are valuable 
because they generate indirect employment, as well as direct jobs, by improving the profitability and 
connectivity of agricultural output.  
 
 Investments in cross-border infrastructure can help to reduce asymmetries in the pace of 
development between neighbouring countries or subregions. One pressing need in this regard is for proper 
infrastructure between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This shortcoming helps to underscore the 
marked differences in the level of per capita GDP and human development by creating obstacles to trade 
and to the mobility of factors between these two economies. These gaps will have been made more acute 
by the catastrophic earthquake that struck Haiti on 12 January 2010. Boosting investment in infrastructure 
is crucially important in the case of countries that share a common border and this should be an important 
part of any reconstruction programme for the battered Haitian economy.  
 
In terms of the social agenda, the various integration schemes could make progress on the 
following tasks: 
 
• Support initiatives to raise the quality of social statistics at the national level and seek 
opportunities to harmonize statistics and make them comparable at the regional level. 
 
• Encourage the identification of best practices in corporate social responsibility at the regional 
level. 
 
• Evaluate possible mechanisms for reducing the transfer costs of remittances that emigrants 
send home to their relatives. 
 
                                                     
20
  For an analysis of the impacts and policy options for investment in infrastructure with emphasis on rural areas in 
Central American countries, see the reports “Identificación de la combinación de inversiones públicas más 
apropiadas durante el periodo de transición hacia la entrada en vigencia del Cafta” (CT. TN/SF-9142RG), IDB-
IFPRI-ECLAC, CAFTA rural development project in Central America, November 2007. 
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• Promote the certification of skills between countries, in order to encourage the intraregional 
mobility of less skilled workers, and take steps to create multi-country training programmes, 
utilizing the common certification. 
 
• Support efforts to make social protection portable, so that workers may retain their acquired 
entitlements and transfer contributions already made. 
 
• Move towards the reciprocal recognition of professional degrees. 
 
• Promote infrastructure investment in border areas, to encourage the formation of integrated 
economic areas and create positive social synergies. 
 
• Support the development of integrated production development strategies in border areas so that 
social policy measures to protect migrants are taken into account along with economic issues. 
 
• Establish a structural fund for social cohesion that will contribute both to funding productive 
and employment restructuring processes and to reproducing the best social protection 
experiences for dealing with crises. Such a fund —which would be endowed with an 
institutional structure to ensure that it is properly managed— could complement the structural 
funds of MERCOSUR and draw on European experience. The respective European entities 
and regional and multilateral financial institutions would be requested to collaborate in its 
design and implementation.  
 
• Finance multi-country projects devoted to the issues already identified as priority matters for 
social integration mechanisms. In the case of Central America, emphasis should be placed on 
programmes relating to early childhood development; maternal mortality; social protection 
for migrants and social vulnerability in the face of natural disasters. 
 
• Strengthen regional capacities for monitoring and evaluating social programmes, specifically 
conditional transfer programmes from the perspective of gender, multiculturalism and the 
rights of vulnerable groups. 
 
• Create a social inclusion observatory that would provide Governments, academic institutions, 
congresses and civil society with data needed to monitor social policy and create 
opportunities for exchanging experiences and disseminating best practices. 
 
 
4. A decisive approach to asymmetries 
 
One of the original aspirations for integration agreements was that they would achieve greater cohesion 
among the parties. Every Latin American and Caribbean integration project has recognized the structural 
disparities between its members’ respective degrees of development (see table V.3 for indicators of 
asymmetries and box V.7 for a summary of how the various integration schemes treat these asymmetries). 
Undoubtedly, low income level, the small size of the country and the scale of production, small population 
or landlocked or island status are among the factors that can hamper the economic growth or international 
integration of a country or its regions, since these factors raise transaction costs and make it difficult for 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: ASYMMETRIES IN THE SUBREGIONS, 2008 
(Factor by which the highest value in the group exceeds the lowest) 
 
Per capita 
GDP Population Territory 
Countries with the lowest GDP 
in each subregion 
Andean Community (1969) 2.6 4.7 4.5 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Ecuador 
Southern Common Market (1991) 6.4 57.8 48.3 Paraguay, Uruguay 
Central American Common Market (1960) 5.8 3.0 6.2 Nicaragua, Honduras 
Caribbean Community (1973) 47.1 190.5 624.9 Haiti, Guyana 
Latin America and the Caribbean 47.1 3 821.0 24 744.1 Haiti, Nicaragua 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
 
 
 In addition to the asymmetries stemming from structural differences, both between countries and 
between or within regions, others result from the cross-border effects of discretionary public policies 
adopted mainly by the larger countries. These asymmetries are effectively externalities arising from 
policy implementation —macroeconomic or microeconomic— and resulting in loss of export 
competitiveness for relatively less developed countries or in undesirable responses such as higher trade 
barriers or protectionist measures within integration projects. These effects are likely to be especially 
harmful when the members of an integration scheme depend heavily on each other for their trade. 
Therefore, more decisive steps must be taken to implement measures that limit the adverse consequences 
of this type of asymmetry. 
 
In the case of integration in Central America, for several years, development levels, measured in 
terms of per capita GDP, followed a similar trend. Since the 1980s, however, there has been a strong 
tendency towards divergence of those levels. This was caused, on the one hand, by conflicts in three 
countries (Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua) and, on the other, by the economic reforms applied 
since the 1990s, which have tended to favour the more competitive economies, thereby exacerbating the 
asymmetries. As a result, a trend towards divergence has tended to be consolidated between Costa Rica 
and Panama and the rest of the countries of the Central American Isthmus, with El Salvador situated on 
an intermediate path (see figure V.6). 
 
 Reducing asymmetries is a prerequisite for the sustainability and legitimacy of integration 
processes. However, a recent SELA (2009) report reveals that in all subregional Latin American 
integration schemes, the gap between the per capita income of its poorest members and the average for 
the group widened between 1990 and 2007-2008. Under these circumstances, the smallest countries do 
not perceive the current integration schemes as the best solution for meeting their needs for economic 
growth and export diversification. A special effort must be made to ensure that the overarching approach 
adopted for various policy areas —infrastructure, logistics, trade facilitation, energy, and so on— is one 
that asymmetrically benefits smaller economies. The MERCOSUR Structural Convergence Fund 
(FOCEM) is a step in the right direction and could be strengthened by providing additional resources and 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.  
 
 
 Additional efforts must also be made in favour of the landlocked countries —Paraguay and the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia— which suffer the worst structural asymmetries. Owing to the 
characteristics of their production structure and their higher transportation costs, they are also the most 
dependent on the regional market, with 60% of their goods exports being traded within South America. In 
particular, such efforts should focus on facilitating customs procedures for goods in transit (see the 
proposals on trade facilitation in this chapter), the construction of border infrastructure and equipment and 
the provision of financial and technical support for rural development, the environment and education.  
 
In South America, the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) could become a forum for 
cooperation and for the eventual convergence of the region’s different integration schemes. UNASUR should 
explicitly develop policies to reduce asymmetries between its members by setting up financial funds or 
mechanisms, developing intraregional production chains, promoting physical and energy integration and 
cooperating on the management of scarce natural resources. In this respect, it will be recalled that, at the 
request of the Heads of State and Government of the then South American Community of Nations, several 
organizations (MERCOSUR, SELA, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO), ECLAC and 
the Andean Development Corporation) made a joint effort in 2006 to address this issue. This effort is 
recorded in a document21 containing specific recommendations in this regard. 
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The proposals contained in the above-mentioned document are structured around three pillars: 
(i) market access, which incorporates special and differential treatment for the least advantaged nations, 
as well as guarantees of market access for the larger partners; (ii) policies governing treatment of 
structural asymmetries which seek to generate complementarity and competitive development with 
emphasis on support for microenterprises and SMEs, as well as infrastructure improvements in the 
framework of IIRSA; and (iii) strategies for the treatment of asymmetries based on public policies, which 
should focus on cooperation on macroeconomic policies and incentives for investments and exports. The 
following sources of financing have been identified for funding these proposals: financial institutions in 
the region, such as the Andean Development Corporation, the Financial Fund for the Development of the 
River Plate Basin (FONPLATA) and similar national institutions, horizontal cooperation, and non-
refundable international technical cooperation. 
 
In the case of Meso-America, the Heads of State and Government of the Tuxtla Mechanism for 
Dialogue and Coordination decided, at their tenth Summit, to convert existing trade agreements between 
Mexico and Central America into a single partnership agreement. This should prove a framework 
conducive to addressing the issue of preferential treatment for relatively less developed countries. 
 
The creation of FOCEM and the prospective CARICOM regional development fund, together 
with studies for a similar fund in the Central American Common Market and efforts by the Andean 
Community (in the framework of its Integrated Social Development Plan), LAIA, UNASUR and ALBA, 
attest to the political will to persevere with an integration process that will address the concerns of the 
relatively less developed countries. 
 
 
B. THE REGION’S STRENGTH IN MEETING GLOBAL CHALLENGES 
 
 
1. Increasing regional cooperation on innovation and competitiveness 
 
In recent years and until the outbreak of the recent crisis, the Latin American and Caribbean region 
achieved considerable export growth and improved its access to major destination markets. Nevertheless, 
its competitiveness gains are still limited (see figure V.7). One of the obstacles to greater competitiveness 
and higher growth rates has been the region’s weakness in areas such as the development of new products 
and processes, the formulation of business strategies that enable companies to engage more productively 
in international value chains, and the incorporation of new technologies, including ICT. 
 
In this regard, the context of the knowledge economy poses new challenges for the countries of 
the region, where increasingly, science, technology and innovation play a significant role in the pattern of 
international integration and economic and social development and where, increasingly, synergies, 
complementarities and networks are needed for the generation, dissemination and application of 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of statistics from the World 




 The real challenge in this regard resides in changing production patterns with a view to 
developing more knowledge-intensive societies, that is, in the capacity to diversify the production and 
export base and incorporate greater value and knowledge into exported goods and services. For this it is 
necessary to strengthen the links between exports of primary goods, manufactures and services through 
production clusters or value chains, encouraging SMEs to participate in them as direct or indirect 
exporters. This, in turn, requires greater coordination within Government and between Government and 
the private sector. The most successful international positioning efforts show that it is necessary, on the 
one hand, to create close public-private partnerships to encourage innovation and investment in export 
industries and, on the other, to increase coordination among the various public institutions involved in 
providing productive and technological support to SMEs, promoting exports and FDI, implementing 
innovation policy and developing human resources (ECLAC, 2008a). A number of these issues figure on 
national competitiveness agendas in the region (ECLAC, 2008c). 
 
Nevertheless, economies will only be able to incorporate technologies to the extent that they are 
able to absorb them. A targeted strategy is needed in order to move forward on these challenges, with 
specific targets and guaranteed financing of policies and programmes. This is illustrated, for example, by 
Brazil’s production development policy (PDP), which builds on measures to generate positive 
externalities in the production apparatus, strategic targeting of issues that are important for the country’s 
long-term development and structural programmes focused on the various production systems. But it is 
also a systemic strategy inasmuch as it is closely coordinated with the infrastructure projects being carried 
out under the Growth Acceleration Programme (PAC), innovation work conducted under the Programme 
of Action on Science, Technology and Innovation, education for new industries and efforts in the area of 
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 At first glance, the current crisis may not appear to offer the most propitious conditions for 
developing policies on changing the production structure, increasing competitiveness and strengthening 
international integration. Nonetheless, crises bring both threats and opportunities and tend to be 
conducive to seeking new paths and agreements. It is no coincidence that the radical strategies undertaken 
to change production patterns in Finland, Ireland, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea and Singapore were 
developed in response to serious crises. 
 
Given the scope of these tasks, which tend to exceed national capacities, regional cooperation is 
an important alternative that can enable countries to combine their efforts to attain the levels of quality, 
scale and productivity required in the global economy. The countries of the region could make use of 
regional forums for dialogue and experience-sharing between public and private stakeholders on 
successful initiatives in innovation, competitiveness and social cohesion. The following section proposes 
a regional forum for innovation which could play a part in these tasks.  
 
Today, the agenda of several Governments in the region acknowledges the importance of science, 
technology and innovation for social and economic development, which favours stressing the need for 
mechanisms to support regional cooperation on science, technology and innovation policies. Innovation is 
an increasingly integrated process that takes place in networks and requires interaction and cooperation of 
various agents in both the public and private sectors. The introduction of mechanisms for cooperation in 
science, technology and innovation policies is in keeping with the growing concern over the need to 
strengthen the region’s position in the global knowledge economy, and therefore to leverage existing 
diversity and complementarities.  
 
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean have accumulated experiences and capacities 
in managing policies to support scientific and technological development and innovation. Nevertheless, 
they face the challenge of designing and implementing policies that are in line with changing needs and 
priorities and that will guarantee inclusive, sustainable development in a continually evolving context 
that has been reshaped by the appearance of new actors and new technological paradigms. The diversity 
of the economies of Latin America and the Caribbean in terms of production specialization, patterns of 
integration into international markets and accumulated technological and scientific capacities represents 
an opportunity for the countries to generate synergies and complementarities among themselves in terms 
of scientific and technological development and innovation.  
 
Use should be made of existing openings for cooperation. In recent years, the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean have made some progress in cooperation. This has enabled a degree 
of coordination in science, technology and innovation, but still too little to generate synergies that 
impact decisions relating to trade, investment and international partnerships involving technology 
businesses and innovation. 
 
Towards the end of 2008, several countries of the region expressed concern over the need to 
make progress on the topic and signed the Mechanism for Regional Dialogue on Science, Technology and 
Innovation Policies, which should continue to be promoted. The idea of the mechanism is to create a 
space for open discussion among the countries of the region in order for questions to be raised and 
proposals to be tabled on addressing the challenges that the economies face in managing and 
implementing science, technology and innovation policies.  
 
Both among the countries of the region and within them there are varying levels of scientific, 
technological and productive capacities. By introducing cooperation mechanisms, the countries of the 
region would be able to share capacities and learning. Such mechanisms would also increase the available 
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critical mass both at the human resources level and at the financial level for conducting large-scale 
projects, and thereby bring together fragmented research efforts in order to generate synergies among the 
various scientific and technological development efforts. This space for discussion is viewed as an open, 
informal forum for discussion on substantive topics relating to science, technology and innovation 
policies of regional interest. The most noteworthy of the activities include:  
 
• The organization of discussion forums on topics of a regional interest in terms of science, 
technology and innovation policies 
• The organization of training courses for policymakers and technology managers in order for 
the countries of the region to exchange experiences and in order for regional dialogue to be 
strengthened at the policy implementation level  
• The development of studies on issues of regional interest  
• The facilitation of coordination efforts among the different actors involved with this 
mechanism for regional dialogue.  
 
 Regarding information and communications technologies (ICT), the eLAC regional strategy has 
been under way since 2005. This new strategy encompasses all of the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean and is based on a long-term vision (through about 2015) that is in keeping with the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). This vision is also 
being pursued through short-term action plans that have quantitative and qualitative targets. One phase of 
the eLAC Plan (eLAC2007) is already complete, and the eLAC 2010 phase is near completion. The second 
implementation phase of eLAC, approved in San Salvador in February 2008, contains elements that are 
inherent to an evolutionary process. These elements can be seen in three fundamental areas: 
 
• The need for a multidimensional approach for addressing the various issues, which do not 
pertain to any specific individual area  
• The internalization by the countries of the dynamic change characteristic of technological progress 
• The need to make progress towards multi-stakeholder collaboration  
 
This can be seen in the restructuring of thematic areas and their inclusion between phases of the 
agenda. The evolution of these thematic areas is leading to a change in priorities, which is bringing about 
a better understanding of the areas themselves. This has led to the consideration of other, complementary 
areas, facilitating more effective advances.  
 
The private sector, especially in the information technology industry in countries such as 
Colombia, Mexico and several Central American countries, has been signing cooperation agreements to 
create synergies through initiatives, strategic partnerships and joint activities. These efforts are aimed at 
encouraging the opening of new markets, designing and executing training and technology transfer 
programmes, coordinating and supporting events held to disseminate knowledge on software and ICT and 
promoting experience-sharing among countries. 
 
A higher profile should be given to regional cooperation on education. Education is 
fundamental not only for growth, equity and democratic governance. In Central America, for example, the 
lack of education largely explains the fact that the social exclusion of young people now stands at 
worrisome levels, with high rates of unemployment that have contributed to a decline in security. In some 





Education has acquired a special economic and social importance in the rural areas of Central 
American countries. Education, training and skills development pose a considerable challenge for raising 
agricultural production and employment and consequently for reducing rural poverty. ECLAC studies show 
that in rural Mexico, persons who have completed primary school are, on average, 6% less likely to fall into 
poverty, and in the case of those who have completed their secondary education, the likelihood is nearly 
10% lower (Ordaz, 2009). In addition, modern production processes in agricultural activities require 
educational and training levels and knowledge not found among most of the rural population, especially 
with the incorporation of biotechnology and practices for selling on international markets according to 
standards that conform to trade agreements or to biosafety or food safety rules, among others.  
 
In the context of the knowledge economy, innovation and competitiveness cannot be properly 
fostered without trained human resources, especially in fields in which the region has or might acquire 
competitive advantages. The linkages between the educational system and the productive system must be 
strengthened to allow the former to provide the skills needed by the latter. This requires long-term 
strategies and action plans for education. 
 
 It is clear today that regional synergies between education plans and human resource training are 
being underutilized. Much could be gained from sharing innovative, successful experiences on curricula, 
management, the adoption of new technologies, teacher training and refresher courses, online classrooms 
and distance education. The region could also benefit from examining international best practices and the 
work done by the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in this 
regard, exploring the possibilities of both cooperation initiatives and services exports.  
 
Proposals for regional cooperation on innovation and competitiveness:  
 
• Establish a regional forum for innovation to foster cooperation and joint action and help the 
countries of the region to meet the challenges posed by innovation and technological development 
 
• Create a regional cooperation fund for innovation to source financing for the programmes or 
actions identified at the regional forum or at other forums for cooperation 
 
• Promote the creation and development of regional business foundations for innovation 
 
• Introduce programmes to encourage a larger number of socially excluded young people and 
women to study in the various fields of learning available in the higher education system  
 
• Prepare an annual report on regional innovation initiatives that will guide relevant regional 
and national efforts and contribute to the sharing of experiences 
 
• Continue conducting comparative analyses of national information society strategies through 
the publication of country reviews 
 
• Support the White Book of e-Government Interoperability in Latin America and the 
Caribbean as a common framework for regional action and discussion on ICT 
 
• Develop regional capacity in effective ICT use in the following areas: (i) e-government; 
(ii) ICT-related industries (for example, creative and cultural industries and those involved in 
software production); (iii) high-speed networks; (iv) health; and (v) education. 
  
74
2. Deepening regional integration through ties with Asia-Pacific 
 
From 2003 to 2007, per capita GDP in Latin America and the Caribbean rose by more than 3% per year, 
making this the strongest growth period in 40 years. This was largely the result of a favourable external 
cycle, heavily influenced by high economic growth in China. It is therefore hardly surprising that the 
region has been strengthening ties with Asia-Pacific and, in particular, with China. Although this was 
especially true in South America, Costa Rica offers an interesting Central American example of export 
diversification towards Asia.  
 
 China has become a significant trading partner for most of the Latin American economies and 
is the largest export market for Brazil and Chile and the second largest export market for Argentina, Costa 
Rica, Cuba and Peru (see table V.4). Strong Chinese demand for food, energy, metals and minerals has 




SELECTED COUNTRIES: CHINA’S POSITION AS A TRADING PARTNER, 2000 AND 2008 
 Exports (destination)  Imports (origin) 
 2000 2008  2000 2008 
Argentina 6 2  4 3 
Brazil 12 1  11 2 
Chile 5 1  4 2 
Colombia 35 4  15 2 
Peru 4 2  13 2 
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 37 3  18 3 
Costa Rica 26 2  16 3 
Mexico 25 5  6 3 
Cuba 5 2  5 2 
China is an important destination for exports China is an increasingly important source of imports for 32 countries: 
• Among the top 5 for 10 countries  • Among the top 5 for 23 countries  
• Among the top 2 for 6 countries • Among the top 2 for 5 countries  
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information.  
 
 
Most of region’s exports to China come from South America, while the volume of exports from 
Central America and Mexico is relatively small. For these countries, with the exception of Costa Rica, 
China remains an untapped market. China’s role as a trading partner is greater in terms of Latin 
America’s imports than of its exports, causing an increase in the region’s deficit with that country. 
 
For the region overall, the rapid development of China and India has translated into higher 
demand for commodities exports and also for more sophisticated good and services. The Asian 
economies will raise global demand for energy, food, metals and minerals, causing an increase in the 
volume and value of the region’s exports. Hence, in comparison with previous decades, commodity prices 
will be relatively high, although they can be expected to remain volatile. On the other hand, the labour force 
in these countries will continue to grow and its consumption will diversify as its income increases. This will 
create various opportunities: from a huge demand for low-cost products to niches of consumption of high-
priced specialized goods and services and numerous intermediate situations.  
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China and India will also exert additional competitive pressure on global markets. The two 
countries have a workforce with not only abundant low-wage and low-skill workers but also a large number 
of highly trained scientists and engineers. They will thus become leading actors in global production and in 
technological innovation. Consequently, these new global players increasingly pose a threat to the 
competitive advantages of natural resource-intensive manufacturing and industry in Latin America. 
 
 The largely sporadic efforts to bring the region and the Asia-Pacific closer to one another 
have come from a handful of countries. Chile, Mexico, Peru and several Central American economies 
have reached transpacific trade agreements in recent years. These initiatives point to the determination of 
some Latin American countries to establish long-term ties with the Asia-Pacific region. There is, 
however, a need for a more coordinated strategy among countries or groups of countries to create, through 
various types of public-private partnerships, a link with that region so as to strengthen the connections 
between trade and investment and between production and technology. The creation of the Latin 
American Pacific Basin Initiative in 2007 is a preliminary step in this direction.  
 
 Unlike Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia-Pacific has traditionally enjoyed de facto 
integration, stemming from the prosperity of intraregional trade flows driven by increasing investment 
and production complementarity between the manufacturing sectors of the different countries.22 This 
integration has been fostered by measures taken to facilitate trade and investment flows and promote 
public-private partnerships for business development and by the availability of low-cost labour. In recent 
years, Asia-Pacific has evolved towards a more advanced stage of integration, one of the components of 
which is necessarily an institutional framework. ASEAN has become the hub of this process through a 
series of initiatives to lift restrictions on trade with other Asian countries (see box V.8). 
 
China’s relations with Latin America’s northern subregion have been dominated by two factors: 
the subregion’s geostrategic position and the issue of the recognition of Taiwan province of China. The 
geographic position of the countries of the subregion (Central America, Cuba, Dominican Republic, 
Mexico and Panama) is of both commercial and geopolitical import for China. From the standpoint of 
trade, the proximity to the United States market gives the subregion a competitive advantage in terms of 
logistic costs and responsiveness to consumers. This advantage is enhanced by the fact that the countries 
of Central America as well as the Dominican Republic and Mexico have free trade agreements with the 
United States, allowing them tariff-free access to this country’s market. This encourages Chinese 
investment for the final assembly of its production operations in the countries of the subregion, from 
where its products are sent both to the United States market and to Latin America. Mexico and Central 
America compete to sell products of Chinese origin on the United States market. Mexico is in turn an 
excellent springboard for the final export of Chinese products as well as an attractive potential market in 
its own right. Moreover, the expansion of China in Mexico has increased the interest of companies such 
as FEMSA, Grupo Modelo and Bimbo in investing in China. 
 
                                                     
22
  The intraregional trade coefficient among the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
China, Japan, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, the Republic of 
Korea and Taiwan Province of China rose from 43% at the beginning of the 1990s to 55% in 2006. This 
coefficient is higher than that of the North American Free Trade Agreement and is quickly approaching the 
figure for the European Union. Currently, close to 60% of trade in machinery and transport equipment and in 
parts and components in Asia-Pacific is intraregional.  With China as its hub, Asia-Pacific has become a “global 





THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS AS THE CENTRE OF RECENT 
INTEGRATION EFFORTS IN ASIA 
 
On 1 January 2010, the final phase of the free trade agreement between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) and China began to be implemented, creating the world’s third-largest free trade area after the European 
Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement 
(ACFTA) encompasses 1.86 billion people, internal trade worth US$ 192.6 billion, a combined GDP of US$ 6.6 
trillion and total trade worth US$ 4.3 trillion. Between them, China and ASEAN attracted 10% of global foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in 2008, worth US$ 167.3 billion. 
The agreement includes trade in goods and services and investment, issues that were negotiated 
sequentially. As of 1 January, over 90% of the goods traded between China and ASEAN-6 (Singapore, Thailand, 
Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia) will be tariff-free. The 10% of goods not included have been deemed 
sensitive and will be liberalized later. The agreement will come into force in 2015 for the ASEAN-4 countries (Laos, 
Myanmar, Viet Nam and Cambodia).  
The importance of this agreement lies in the continuity it provides for the Chinese economic structure in the 
provision of the inputs required to produce final products for sale in international markets. China has been 
progressively adding value in its production chains and ASEAN is a good supplier of intermediate inputs, by 
contrast with raw material suppliers located mainly in Latin America and Africa. At the same time, lower demand 
for ASEAN goods in the United States and Europe has made China a vital alternative market for ASEAN. 
In parallel to the trade agreement between China and ASEAN, the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free 
Trade Area (AANZFTA) has come into force, covering a population of 600 million with a combined GDP of 
US$ 2.7 trillion. 
Unlike the agreement reached with China, AANZFTA was negotiated on a “single undertaking” basis, 
creating greater quality demands. Tariffs on over 96% of goods traded will gradually fall to zero by 2015 for 
ASEAN-6 and 2020 for ASEAN-4. 
As part of the intra-ASEAN integration process, under the terms of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 
tariffs on over 99% of goods fell to 0% on 1 January 2010 for ASEAN-6 and will do the same in 2015 for ASEAN-
4, with an immediate reduction to 5%. 
The ASEAN integration process also includes initiatives in the area of trade facilitation, including 
simplified customs procedures, the abolition of non-tariff measures, development of a one-stop shop system, 
improved investment protections, a dispute settlement mechanism, an improved intellectual property protection 
regime and facilitation of the movement of individuals, including professionals and skilled workers. 
While the effort to create an integration process between Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia-Pacific 
requires an agreement to free up trade, there are areas like those mentioned in the previous paragraph that would tie 
Latin America and the Caribbean and ASEAN together more rapidly by generating the synergies needed for closer 
links leading to deeper economic integration. 
Sufficient elements seem to exist for the two regions to work together in these areas of trade and 
investment and maintain and improve the links between them, threatened as they now are by the new regional 
architecture strategies under discussion in Asia-Pacific, which do not include Latin America and the Caribbean. The 
production and trade complementarity between China and Japan on the one hand and ASEAN on the other, now 
reinforced by these free trade agreements, is a serious threat to Latin American and Caribbean economies seeking to 
enhance their trade links with China, as they compete in a number of areas with the ASEAN economies. This is why 
it is so important to develop joint strategies to create closer ties and strategic links with ASEAN and large Asian 
economies such as China and Japan, as efforts undertaken in partnership will be more fruitful than isolated 
initiatives. 
 





The issue of Taiwan province of China is significant, as many of the nations of the subregion 
continue to recognize the government of this entity, rather than that of the People’s Republic of China, as 
legitimate. Because of this, China has taken a special interest in these nations, which has created room for 
strategic initiatives that the subregion might implement through partnerships.  
 
Costa Rica established diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China in mid-2007, spurring 
stronger relations between the two nations, which, in fact, led to the start of negotiations on a free trade 
agreement. Costa Rica is thus strengthening its ties with China, mainly those related to information 
technologies, through Intel and its relationship with Lenovo. Petroleum extraction and refining in Costa 
Rica is another draw for China. The China National Petroleum Corporation has entered into agreements 
with Refinadora Costarricense de Petróleo to modernize existing infrastructure. Costa Rica is seeking to 
strengthen its competitive position in the Chinese market, particularly in tourism and high value added 
products such as gourmet coffee, fruits, juices, vegetables, shellfish and others.  
 
China is keenly interested in strengthening its ties with Panama, among other reasons because the 
Panama Canal is crucial for Chinese trade with Atlantic seaboard ports, particularly those in Argentina, 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil and the eastern United States.23 
 
The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean should examine the growing integration of 
production in Asia, centred on China, and strive to join the value chains being established there. To this 
end, they should encourage Asian investment in Latin America and Latin American investment in Asia and 
the Pacific, as well as partnerships between local and Asian players with a view to making the most of 
trade and investment opportunities. It would also be useful for Latin America and the Caribbean to emulate 
the Asian experience with production integration revolving around regional or subregional value chains. 
 
 Asia-Pacific offers multiple possibilities for export and investment agreements in mining, energy, 
agriculture, infrastructure and science and technology. To make the most of such opportunities, and to do 
so on a significant scale, will take a concerted partnership-building effort. This will require the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries to work in a coordinated manner to leverage convergent, transparent, 
stable policies in order to secure long-term commitments between the two regions. To this end, 
integration mechanisms in the region should be strengthened with a view to developing a regional focal 
point for biregional dialogue with China and Asia-Pacific,24 in order to explore mutually beneficial, 
longer-range initiatives than those that might emerge from isolated national efforts. 25 
 
 Now is the time to forge strategic linkages with China. China has already formulated a foreign 
policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean, enshrined in an official document that acknowledges 
the region’s potential for comprehensive cooperation on political and economic affairs, as well as social, 
cultural, legal and security matters.26 In the economic sphere, China identifies several areas on which joint 
                                                     
23.
  A Chinese logistics firm, Hutchison, plays a key role in activities in the Canal Zone, in the ports of Cristóbal, 
Balboa and Rodman.  Another Chinese firm, China Ocean Shipping (COSCO), the second largest maritime 
transportation company and a major user of the Canal, is playing an important role in modernizing and expanding 
it.  In the financial realm, for example, the only Latin American branch of the Bank of China is located in Panama.   
24
  The Latin American Pacific Basin Initiative, created in 2007 and consisting of the 11 countries bordering the 
Pacific Ocean, was formed with this intention. 
25
  Although several such regional focal points exist today, none has yet acquired the status of acknowledged voice 
for the regional agenda. Progress in creating such a reference would facilitate dialogue between the region and 
ASEAN and China. 
26
  The paper refers to several guiding principles: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-
aggression, noninterference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. 
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progress could be made, including trade, investment, finance, agriculture, industry, infrastructure, natural 
resources, energy and tourism. 
 
 The time is ripe for the Latin American and Caribbean region to identify priorities in its relations 
with China and to propose a mutually beneficial strategic partnership. The region should respond 
promptly to China’s policy paper with one of its own, following the requisite technical meetings. The two 
documents could then be reviewed at a summit of the Heads of State of China and the Latin American 
and Caribbean countries. In preparation for such a summit, a regional programme of trade and investment 
initiatives to help strengthen the region’s economic and commercial ties with China should be drafted. 
 
 Regarding investment, although Latin America and the Caribbean as a region is one of the 
leading recipients of Chinese foreign investment, most of this investment is concentrated in tax havens27. 
Some —but still too few— Chinese companies are now operating in Latin America, especially in the 
petroleum, transportation and telecommunications sectors (see table V.5). Therefore, the region should 




MAIN CHINESE COMPANIES OPERATING IN LATIN AMERICA, MID-2008 













































    X      X    
Brazil  X X  X X X    X   X 
Chile     X      X  X  
Colombia X X        X X  X  
Cuba    X       X    
Ecuador X X  X       X    
Mexico X X X        X X  X 




X X X        X    
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of figures from the consulates of China in Latin 
America and from the Ministry of Commerce of China, Statistics Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment 2006. 
 
 
Admittedly, certain questions have been raised about Chinese FDI in other developing regions, 
especially in Africa. Increased Chinese investment in Latin America and the Caribbean should be based 
on mutual benefit and efforts should be made to prevent it from reinforcing the pattern of exports to China 
—natural resources with little processing— that has hitherto prevailed. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
See “China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean” [online] http://english.gov.cn/ official/2008-
11/05/content_1140347.htm. 
27
  In late 2006, Chinese non-financial enterprises held US$ 75 billion in foreign investments, of which 
US$ 17 billion was invested in 2006. The region received US$ 8.5 billion, or 48% of all Chinese foreign 
investment that year. Most of these funds went to the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. 
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Infrastructure development is one of the priority areas for progress. The reactivation of existing 
projects in Latin America and the Caribbean (Regional Infrastructure Integration in South America 
—IIRSA— and the Meso-America Project) would help to identify specific short-term initiatives, the 
related requirements and the benefits for the region. There are also possibilities for cooperation in some 
areas of natural-resource industries, such as mining and energy, in which massive investments are needed 
to bring projects on stream.  
 
China’s investment potential is underscored by the fact that in 2008 the country held 28.7% of global 
international reserves. The outlook for Chinese investment in the region was recently enhanced when the 
country joined the Inter- American Development Bank. The China Development Bank, the most highly 
capitalized financial entity in the world, is also exploring the possibility of a strategic entry into Latin 
America and the Caribbean. The Bank has offices in 15 countries in the region and is involved in projects in 
several of them, and runs joint operations with the Andean Development Corporation, the Latin American 
Export Bank and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration. The work of the China Development 
Bank could be strengthened by working meetings with regional institutions to discuss investment priorities 
and the strategic emphasis of the Latin American and Caribbean Governments as regards infrastructure, 
logistics, trade facilitation, technological innovation and human resource development. 
 
 Regarding the services sector, nearly all of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean, 
with very few exceptions, have a tourism industry that is full of potential but underdeveloped. One 
immediate task would be to develop joint initiatives with China to promote tourism from that country, for 
example, by taking steps to facilitate travel by Chinese to and within the region, including visa issuance. 
Other areas suggested by the Chinese authorities are banking, telecommunications, transportation, 
education and medical services.28 China possesses vast industrial and technological capacities that could 
support the development of telecoms infrastructure and thus improve connectivity in the region’s most 
isolated areas. 
 
Lastly, there are also opportunities for trade cooperation. One noteworthy example is the 70 
billion yuan (US$ 10.2 billion) currency swap agreement struck between Argentina and China in March 
2009, allowing the Argentine Government to pay for Chinese imports in yuan. This arrangement is 
intended to ensure the smooth flow of payments for trade transactions in the event of an international 
liquidity squeeze. China has reached similar agreements with several Asian countries, including 
Indonesia, Malaysia and the Republic of Korea 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean still need to find a viable strategy for forging closer strategic 
ties with China and for seizing the opportunities emerging in Asia-Pacific. The increasingly strong links 
between China and the economies of the region, particularly those of South America, reinforce the 
dilemma for the region’s development strategy. Among those countries that export mostly raw materials 
to China, the current type of linkage weakens incentives to diversify into services and manufactured 
goods and tends to reinforce incentives for countries to continue to rely on static comparative advantages. 
For the countries of Central America and Mexico, the situation is perhaps more complex, given that they 
do not sell commodities to China although they do compete with Chinese products in the United States 
market, where they sell labour-intensive manufactures, an area in which China and other emerging Asian 
economies have clear advantages. 
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 China’s ascendancy may represent both an opportunity and a significant risk in the medium and 
long terms. It will be an opportunity to the extent that it induces countries to rethink their strategy to 
change their production model and to enter the global economy, as well as to introduce more proactive 
policies for productive development, competitiveness and innovation. This will require significantly 
strengthening technological capacities in order to compete on the global market on the basis of higher 
valued added products and knowledge-based goods. A regional or subregional cooperation effort along 
this line appears to be increasingly urgent.  
 
 
3. A united voice on reforming the international financial system 
 
Given that the current global financial system has been unable to prevent or mitigate the impacts of 
changes in the economic cycle, as demonstrated by the most recent crisis, the future financial architecture 
must be endowed with greater countercyclical and crisis-prevention capacity, including a reform of 
governance at regional and multilateral institutions.  
 
The proper handling of economic crises requires that liquidity be provided on a global scale and 
in a countercyclical, inclusive manner. The recent reforms at institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank, although limited, are a step in the right direction: an increase in their 
capitalization level, changes in borrowing conditions (greater flexibility on the use and countercyclical 
potential of loans) and the development of a multilateral framework to manage countries’ problems of 
overindebtedness.  
 
Crisis prevention requires a suitable oversight and regulatory system, to control, monitor and 
spread financial-system risk. This entails: (i) strengthening microprudential oversight and regulation 
and complementing it with a macroprudential approach; (ii) designing provisioning rules in order for 
the financial system to absorb shocks, rather than magnify them; (iii) strengthening surveillance 
mechanisms, including through an early warning system; and (iv) promoting enhanced transparency 
and accountability practices. 
 
Subregional financial cooperation may and must play a significant role by complementing the 
global financial architecture. Stronger regional institutions would provide additional defence against the 
effects of a financial crisis and help avoid financial contagion, ensuring stability and the proper 
functioning of the global financial system. To this end, it is imperative to: (i) strengthen the Latin 
American Reserve Fund; (ii) consolidate the capital market at the regional and subregional levels; and 
(iii) strengthen the role of subregional development banks.  
 
There is also a need to thoroughly reform the governance of the institutions that make up the 
international architecture. Such a reform must take account of the requirements of all countries, especially 
developing countries, in decision-making and the rule-design. Recent efforts of this type have been 
limited, and substantial changes have not been made in the way the IMF, the World Bank, the Basel 
Committee on the Banking Supervision or the Financial Stability Forum are managed. The lack of 
representation of developing countries at multilateral forums makes these institutions’ analyses and 
recommendations on regulatory policies incomplete, which leads to significant mistakes, as evidenced by 
the oversight and regulatory failures that were among the leading causes of the current crisis.  
 
The reform of global governance hence requires a collective effort to fill the existing institutional 
void in the coordination and management of globalization. This collective effort should focus on 
increasing the coherence and consistency of the monetary, financial and trade systems and ensure that 
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these systems promote the fulfilment of the globally agreed development goals, including on 
environmental and social sustainability, and the Millennium Development Goals.  
 
The United Nations may play a crucial role in meeting this challenge. As the only organization 
with universal membership, it is in the best position to ensure the legitimacy and viability of a reform to 
the system of governance. A first step for a new type of governance is to enhance the role played today by 
the Economic and Social Council, through the creation of a forum to serve as a coordinating body and as 
a forum for discussion among the countries on economic, social and environmental issues.  
 
In any event, the region’s positions on global financial reform would have greater repercussion if, 
in addition to being expressed with a single voice, they were built on post-crisis achievements in financial 
cooperation and the efforts of regional or subregional development banks.  
 
 
4. Jointly tackling environmental and climate change challenges 
 
In recent years, the environmental sustainability of economic activities, particularly as regards climate 
change, has become a pivotal issue in international discussions. Various initiatives are under way in this 
area, both at the multilateral level and within some of the world’s largest economies (see chapter I). How 
these processes play out will have many key implications for the region —for example, the ease of its 
products’ access to industrialized country markets. Although the Latin American and Caribbean region 
accounts for a modest proportion of all greenhouse gas emissions (11.8% in 2000), its share will probably 
increase in coming decades owing to economic and demographic growth (ECLAC, 2009b chapter VI and 
ECLAC, 2009e).  
 
It is crucial that Latin America and the Caribbean quickly reach a comprehensive agreement on 
climate change. Without a new multilateral agreement that reflects the various economies’ contribution to 
climate change more effectively than the current one does, there is an increased risk that industrialized 
countries will resort to unilateral trade measures. The risk is not only that such measures would be 
protectionist but that they would weaken international cooperation efforts that are essential to effectively 
tackle climate change. Consequently, there is a need to step up efforts to reach a binding agreement in 2010, 
based on the political agreement recently reached at the Copenhagen conference. 
 
Nevertheless, the negotiations currently underway are complex, as made evident by the events in 
Copenhagen. The explanations for these disappointing results are to be found in the more stringent 
requirements that will have to be assumed by developed countries on reductions and on financial and 
technological transfers; the greater role that some developing countries will be required to play in 
mitigation efforts; and the difficulty of agreeing on criteria that will make it possible to determine who 
must contribute to future mitigation efforts and under what circumstances these parties must do so. The 
Governments of the region need to have better information on costs and opportunities and to quickly 
prepare and unify their stance on these topics and, ideally, on the environmental goods and services talks 
taking place in the framework of the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization. If the region fails to 
do so and arrives late, within a few years it might be required to conform to global standards that fail to 
take into account its interests, thereby having to face environmental and energy standards that will hamper 
its ability to better compete. The Governments should also strive to apply the principles upheld in 





 There is also great scope for developing regional cooperation in this area, in terms of information, 
public policy as well as the private sector. For example, the business community is keenly interested in 
establishing common technical standards on environmental matters and on the “carbon footprint” or on 
greenhouse gases emitted in the process of producing and distributing certain products. If each country in 
the region addresses these issues in isolation, the synergies from collaboration and economies of scale 
will be lost. The expansion of existing cooperation efforts, on the basis of specific projects and sufficient 
funding, should encourage universities and technology centres to establish closer ties with the production 
apparatus and hence develop technologies and processes with a high export potential.29 
 
 Beyond the realm of international negotiations, a central challenge for the region is to enhance 
regional cooperation initiatives in order to implement adaptation and mitigation measures, for example, 
on the incorporation of environmentally friendly processes and products into national and regional 
development strategies. Various types of cooperation will be required, of which ECLAC (2009b) has 
identified the following: 
 
• Creation of a climate-change policy observatory to monitor discussions and progress on the 
topic and the measures taken by business and government, including in the industrialized 
world, in order to prepare for the opportunities and challenges that arise in connection with 
adaptation and mitigation, including the handling of extreme events. 
 
• Development of specific studies and methodologies for evaluating the economic impact of 
climate change in the various sectors and subregions, based on different scenarios, in order to 
identify adaptation needs, mitigation opportunities as well as the need for international 
transfers. These studies must address public policy options, such as the fiscal approaches, 
ecosystem-service and biodiversity management and poverty-reduction strategies.  
 
• Conducting of policy development support programmes, including on an international scale, 
relating to issues such as: renewable energy production; consumer product energy efficiency 
and labelling; energy-efficient transportation, industries and buildings; clean production; the 
standardization of biofuels and methods to evaluate their impact; improvement of standards 
for competitive export sectors; and incorporation of externalities in assessments of public and 
private investment projects. 
 
• Fostering and sharing of experiences in the design of projects for the carbon market. 
 
• Cooperation on adapting national finance institutions and facilities to the requirements of 
projects for mitigating the impact of climate change. 
 
• Coordination of different regional initiatives and approaches in order to increase the region’s 
relative influence over the issue. The challenge consists of building competitive advantages 
based on a shared regional approach to climate change, establishing proposals and jointly 
obtaining access to international funds for capacity-building and technology transfer, both for 
adaptation and mitigation. 
 
                                                     
29
  A rapid consensus should be reached on automobiles produced within MERCOSUR, as well as on electrical 
equipment and the chemical and paper industries (statement by Enrique Mantilla, President of the Chamber of 
Exporters of Argentina, or EXPORTAR). In addition, international transport of primary sector goods and 
products appears to be a natural candidate for coordination in this area.   
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• Agreement on needed carbon market reforms, including the evaluation of mechanisms used 
to finance adaptation measures  
 
• Coordination of policies for boosting investments in lower-carbon technologies, so as to 
advance towards a regional consensus on a set of public policies that promote the move 
towards less carbon-intensive economies.  
 
• The encouragement of cooperation initiatives among business organizations from various 
countries of the region in order to share sectoral approaches to climate change, as well as warning 









In a globalized economy, the overall competitiveness of the region has a strong bearing on that of its 
individual countries. An auspicious regional context favours national efforts to promote competitiveness, 
leverages benefits and allows countries to aim for more ambitious goals. Conversely, a less stimulating 
environment undermines any domestic policy to promote competitiveness, no matter how large the country. 
 
Beyond certain minor nuances, the recent global crisis has made it clear that the broad trends in 
the global economy tend to override the specific features of individual countries. Trends in country risk, 
terms of trade, FDI attraction and even ranges of economic growth are becoming increasingly similar 
across the region. The overall patterns even appear somewhat insensitive to individual efforts in various 
areas of public policy, especially in the case of the smaller countries. But this “limitation” could be turned 
into a strength if joint programmes were developed to invest in infrastructure and trade facilitation and 
finance regional trade —provided that the pillar of macroeconomic stability is preserved. Such action, 
which is possible today precisely because of gains in terms of economic stability, would make the region 
more attractive, open up new trade and investment possibilities, help dispel the negative business climate 
and send out new signals of regional maturity that would soon be reflected in lower indicators of country 
risk and higher international competitiveness. 
 
The differences on trade matters should not represent an obstacle to making progress on other, 
perhaps more pressing, issues. Indeed, joint efforts to strengthen ties with Asia and the Pacific through 
multinational business and ministerial missions would help to promote project portfolios in infrastructure, 
energy, banking, tourism and logistics, to the benefit of both regions. In addition, encouraging the 
creation of regional and subregional value chains would link the internationalization decisions of the 
leading economic players with the integration process. 
 
 Crises are the right time to invest in market intelligence, develop the country brand and build the 
loyalty of importers. Some of these initiatives could be undertaken on a multi-country level to harness 
synergies and economies of scale, particularly for positioning in the Asian market. 
 
Another pressing task is to strengthen partnering for innovation and competitiveness. Engaging 
technology centres in joint business and research activities can create synergies and build a critical mass of 
human resources despite the limited funding that the region allocates to these issues of the future. Aid-for-
trade programmes to modernize customs, ports, infrastructure, logistics, connectivity and ICT 
interoperability across several countries are another ideal area for regional cooperation. Hence, unilateral 
alternatives will continue to be second-best choices, because they forgo the possibilities offered by 
coordinated efforts among countries as well as the advantages of expanded markets and policy convergence. 
 
Measures taken to advance this agenda will give a powerful signal of practical commitment to 
integration. This, in turn, will enable progress towards unification of markets in the region, by stimulating 
intraregional trade and investment, improving the region’s international position and addressing social 
challenges and asymmetries. But headway cannot be made in those areas without a more solid and effective 
regional institutional framework built up around the subregional integration agreements. This framework 
must play a key role in protecting the interests of the smaller countries with regard to their larger partners. It 
should also serve to mediate in any conflicts of interest that might arise among the various member 




In this regard, one of the promising areas for regional cooperation would be the construction of a 
shared vision for medium- and long-term development, starting with the definition of the region’s 
strategic objectives and the improvement of its position in global value chains. The current context —the 
gradual recovery from the international crisis— would seem a good moment to include this topic on the 
regional agenda as it would raise the status of the subregional integration processes already under way 
and encourage novel proposals for boosting regional cooperation. 
 
As noted in this document, views on the contribution that international trade and integration in the 
global economy make to economic growth and the well-being of the population at large vary across the 
region. These discrepancies should not, however, prevent progress on other regional cooperation matters 
that may be more relevant to efforts to overcome the challenges to the region’s competitiveness. These 
strategic issues do not need to be subordinated to progress in the area of trade liberalization. Even without 
moving ahead on that front, steps could be taken to improve infrastructure, connectivity, social cohesion, 
innovation and aid for trade in the relatively less developed economies and to frame unified positions for 
responding to the challenges of climate change and the reform of the international financial system and 
for drawing up a joint strategy to forge closer ties with China and Asia-Pacific. 
 
Bridging communication gaps and furthering the gradual convergence of the various integration 
and cooperation schemes under way would certainly help the region advance in that direction. By 
adopting a realistic approach and acknowledging subregional differences and existing political obstacles, 
it should be possible to foster areas of convergence which, though varying in shape and size and 
dependent on good will and a profound commitment to integration, will gradually pave the way towards a 
representative regional institution that speaks with a single voice to defend and promote the interests of 
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